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THE INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION ACT
OF 1983: HAS IT HAD AN EFFECT ON THE LATIN
AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS?
Lyle B. Vander Schaaf*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress enacted the International Lending Su-
pervision Act (the "Act" or "ILSA") in 1983.1 This legislation was
designed to decrease the risk associated with bank loans to foreign bor-
rowers experiencing difficulty servicing their debts.2 The Act attempted
to force banks to lend more responsibly in an effort to halt the interna-
tional debt crisis, particularly the crisis associated with Latin American
debtors.3 The Act also attempted to prevent a strangulation of loans to
the debtor countries.4 If the legislators had required banks to entirely
discontinue lending to foreign debtors, an international economic crisis
would have resulted, which is something neither the legislators nor the
banks and debtor countries desired.5 Despite the enactment of ILSA,
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat.
1278 (1983) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912 (West Supp. 1986))
[hereinafter ILSA]; cf., e.g., Comment, New Controls on Global Debt: The Interna-
tional Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 425 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter New Controls on Debt] (analyzing the legislation directly after enactment); Recent
Development, New Limits on Banks Lending to Foreign Nations, 17 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 711 (1984) [hereinafter Lending to Foreign Nations] (providing the history of
ILSA and its provisions); Mitchell, New Rules for International Lending, N.Y.LJ.,
Apr. 25, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Comment, The International Lending Supervision Act of
1983: A First Step Toward Responsible Foreign Lending, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. -
193 (1985) [hereinafter Responsible Foreign Lending] (describing ILSA and some of
the regulations promulgated under it).
2. Review of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9
(1986) [hereinafter Review of ILSA].
3. See id. at 1, 8-9, 11 (noting the purpose and intent of ILSA).
4. See infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that a cessation
of loans would have on the economics of the debtor nations).
5. See Proposal for Legislation to Increase the Resources of the International
Monetary Fund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Mone-
tary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 140 (1983) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on International Debt] (remarks of
Lionell Olmer, Under Secretary for International Trade) (cautioning against establish-
ing regulations that would send negative signals to banks and provide disincentives for
lending); id. at 199 (statement of George J. Clark, Executive Vice President of Ci-
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the Latin American debt crisis has not dissipated. As a consequence,
banks continue to seek investment and accounting solutions for debtor
countries that show little opportunity for repayment of their loans, and
Congress continues to observe closely the United States banking
industry.6
It is important to understand the extent of the crisis before analyzing
the statutes and regulations promulgated to deal with it. Part I of this
Comment examines the Latin American debt crisis. Part II analyzes
the effect of ILSA to determine whether it has forced banks to lend
more responsibly to Latin American debtor nations and whether the
regulations have alleviated the Latin American debt crisis. This section
concludes that ILSA has not solved the crisis. Part III of this Comment
analyzes other measures that banks employ, including establishing in-
creased loan loss reserves, rescheduling existing loans, syndicating ex-
isting loans, selling and swapping loans, and participating in debt-eq-
uity swaps. These innovations reflect the struggle banks experience
while coping with ILSA and the continuing Latin American debt crisis.
This Comment concludes that many of these independent accounting
measures and investment transactions, rather than ILSA, have reduced
some of the risks associated with the Latin American debt crisis.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS
Many economists and officials who have studied the Latin American
debt crisis are concerned over the increasingly large debts that Latin
American countries owe to United States lenders. Although many fac-
tors contributed to the Latin American debt crisis,' most economists
tibank) (noting that a low interest rate requirement would drive banks away from pro-
viding loans at a time when they are most needed); id. at 13 (showing Senator Heinz's
concern for the adverse impact that increased regulations could create).
6. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2 (examining whether ILSA has had a positive
impact on the international lending practices of banks and the international debt
crisis).
7. See, e.g., Meissner, Crisis as an Opportunity for Change: A Commentary on the
Debt Restructuring Process, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 613, 614 (1985) (charging
that the Federal Reserve Bank's change in interest rate policy in the fall of 1979
caused severe recessions in industrialized nations); Friesen, The Regulation and Super-
vision of International Lending: Part I, 19 INT'L LAW. 1059, 1090-2064 (1985) (stat-
ing that in 1984 over 30 developing countries had a debt of $400 billion and that
recession, inflation, and regulation caused the debt crisis); see Bradley, Defusing the
Latin Debt Bomb: Squeezing the Debtors Will Make Things Worse for Them and Us,
Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1986, at C2, col. 1 (arguing that capital flight outstripped incom-
ing investment or foreign loans and contributed to the debt crisis); Brown, The Behav-
ior of Transnational Banks and the Debt Crisis, 21 C.T.C REP. 24, 27 (1986) (stating
that inadequate volumes of non-ancessional external capital flows contributed to the
debt crisis); Avittey, The Truth in Lending to Third World Governments, Wall St. J.,
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and officials generally agree that a major cause was the recycling of
petro-dollars in the early 1970s.8
Debtor countries continue to struggle to service their external loans
from United States banks.' Meeting these payments places severe
hardships on the domestic economic, 10 political,11 and social 12 environ-
Oct. 11, 1984, at 32, col. 3 (recognizing systematic corruption and waste in less devel-
oped countries as causes of the debt crisis); Gall, Games Bankers Play, FORBES, Dec. 5,
1983, at 172 (stating that printing money simply to monetize the debt exacerbates
other economic problems and contributes to the crisis); Sargen, Managed Lending: An
Assessment of the Current Strategy Toward LDC Debt, 17 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & PoL
533, 535 (1985) (citing poor government policies of overly expansionary demand, inap-
propriate exchange rates, and development strategies that shifted production away
from export sectors as causes of the debt crisis); cf., e.g., Meissner, supra, at 613-14
(noting the shift in emphasis in lending from trade and project financing to balance of
payments support as the debt crisis developed); Lowenfield, Foreword, 17 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & PoL. 485, 487-89 (1985) (describing the crisis as so broad that Dante could
have filled an additional canto in the Inferno); Brown, supra, at 24 (noting reduced
bank lending and a sharp decline in foreign direct investment as obstacles to debtor
nations using project loan financing to pay off their debts); Clark, Who's Fouling Up
International Finance? Everybody, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1984, at 31, col. 3 (describing
the inability of developing nations to manage their governments, the weakness of the
dollar, and the long recession as causes of the debt crisis).
8. See Meissner, supra note 7, at 613 (attributing the origins of the debt crisis to
the recycling of petro-dollars following the 1973 oil price increases); New Controls on
Debt, supra note 1, at 426 (stating that the oil price increases during 1973 and 1974
increased bank lending to developing countries); Responsible Foreign Lending, supra
note 1, at 193 (stating that the recycling of petro-dollars in the 1970s led to increased
lending to lesser developed countries); cf. Friesen, supra note 7, at 1060-64 (observing
that the outstanding debt of developing countries expanded tenfold between 1979 and
1984); New Controls on Debt, supra note 1, at 406 (stating that commercial lending to
developing countries increased at an annual rate of approximately 20% between the
mid-1970s and the early* 1980s).
9. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, The Debt Crisis: The Case of the Small and Medium
Size Debtors, 17 N.Y.U.J. INTr'L L. & POL. 527, 529 (1985). To participate in any
United States bank, World Bank, or International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan restruc-
turing plan, debtor countries must enact "austerity programs" that usually have an
adverse impact on their domestic economies. Id.
To make payments on these large debts most Latin American countries must use up
to 50% of their export receipts. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Bank Stock Q., Nov. 5,
1984, at 64; Table 19 Debt Service Ratio 1983, Thirteen Selected Developing Coun-
tries in Latin America and Asia, cited in Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra, at 531; cf. B.
BALASSA, G. BUENO, P. KUCZYNSKI & M. SIMONSEN, TOWARD RENEWED GROWTH IN
LATIN AMERICA 16, 70 (Institute for International Economics 1986) [hereinafter B.
BALASSA] (indicating that interest payments comprised one-third of the exports from
Latin American countries in 1985).
10. See WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 1986 111-14 (1986)
(indicating that gross domestic product is increasing at a slower pace in all Latin
American countries, except Brazil, in part because of the global debt); World Bank,
Development and Debt Service: Dilemma of the 1980s, in INTRODUCTION, WORLD
DEBT TABLES 1985-86 (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 472 [hereinafter WORLD DEBT
TABLES] (showing that the gross domestic product figures of Latin American countries
are growing slowly in the 1980s); B. BALASSA, supra note 9, at 16, 52-53 (indicating
that per capita income and the gross domestic product of Latin American nations are
692 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 2:689
ment of most debtor countries. The effects of the international debt
crisis harm the United States and other industrial countries as much as
they harm the indebted developing countries.1 3 The United States
banks and officials from the Treasury Department insist that although
low because of the global recession).
To repay their loans, debtor countries have slowed their economies, slashed imports,
and created massive trade surpluses. Samuelson, It's Time for the U.S. Banks to Write
Down Latin Loans, L.A. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, part II, at 5, col. 1 [hereinafter Time
for Banks to Write Down Loans]; cf. Bradley, supra note 7, at C2, col. 1 (stating that
Latin American countries have boosted exports to service their debts). The trade sur-
plus of Argentina was 7.9% of its total output in 1985. Time for Banks to Write Down
Loans, supra, part II, at 5, col. 1. Brazil and Mexico had trade surpluses of 5.7% and
4.8% of total output respectively. Id. Furthermore, austerity measures have severely
limited the domestic consumption and investment in many debtor countries. Bradley,
supra note 7, at C2, col. 1.
According to Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), the loss of exports to Latin America
since the onset of the debt crisis caused the loss of 800,000 United States jobs. Id.
Moreover, increased imports from Latin America caused additional unemployment in
the United States. Id.
The GNP of Latin American countries also decreased because of the debt crisis.
WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra, at 464; cf. Sargen, supra note 7, at 538 (citing an aver-
age loss of two percent in real GNP in the region between 1981 and 1983).
11. Lekachman, Banks Deserve a Penalty for Folly, L.A. Times, June 19, 1984,
part IV, at 3, col. 3. Raul Alfonsin, President of Argentina, asserted that IMF restruc-
turing conditions for his country threaten its fragile hopes for democracy. Id. Attempts
of the Dominican Republic to meet stiff IMF measures outlined in an IMF loan pack-
age resulted in riots. Id.; see also Rout, Postponement of Third World Debts Threat-
ens Upheaval, Financial Collapse, Wall St. J., June 22, 1984, at 35, col. 2 [hereinafter
Rout, Postponement of Third World Debts] (quoting Brazilian economist Edmar
Bacha's fears that unless the economy of his country begins to grow, the government
could become fascist).
12. See Lekachman, supra note 11, part IV, at 3, col. 3 (indicating that the stan-
dard of living in Brazil decreased by 15% as its government attempted to meet its debt
obligations). The Brazilian economy would need to grow 6.5% a year in real terms
between 1984 and 1989 simply to return to the 1980 standard of living. Rout, supra
note 11, at 35 (citing a 12% decline in per capita income between 1979 and 1982); see
also Bradley, supra note 7, at C2, col. 1 (noting that Latin American nations paid
$100 billion to the creditor countries in the past four years, even though some of these
debtors experienced recessions and could neither feed their poor nor invest in their own
economic development).
13. Bradley, supra note 7, at C2, col. 1; see also Rowen, Trade Deficits Inexorably
Tied to Debt Crisis, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1986, at HI, col. 1 [hereinafter Trade Defi-
cits Tied to Debt Crisis] (stating that the Third World debt has curtailed the ability of
Latin American countries to purchase United States products); Review of lISA, supra
note 2, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Heinz) (noting that less developed countries
account for nearly two-thirds of United States exports, and likening the United States
trade recovery to LDC recovery). Senator Bradley provides several examples of ways
the Latin American debt directly harms the United States, including economic dam-
age, damage communist insurgencies impose on Latin America, and waves of illegal
immigration. Bradley, supra note 7, at C2, col. 1. Senator Bradley further demon-
strates that Latin American countries' fulfillment of debt payments through 1985 cre-
ated disastrous consequences for United States farmers, factory workers, and exporters.
Id.
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the actual debt is increasing, 4 the international debt crisis is stabiliz-
ing. 5 A more realistic appraisal of the situation indicates that the debt
crisis is a long-term problem that will burden the world economy
throughout the 1990s and perhaps beyond."
Although United States banks claim that the crisis is abating, they
have become reluctant to lend additional money to Latin American
14. See WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 10, at 459-63, 472 (providing graphs and
analysis indicating that the debt of Latin American countries is increasing); Wall St.
J., Mar. 27, 1986, at 64, col. 2 (citing a World Bank prediction that the total external
debt of developing countries to both public and private creditors would continue to
increase in the future).
15. See James A. Baker, III, Statement Before the Meetings of the Interim Com-
mittee of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Development Committee of the
World Bank and the IMF, TREASURY NEWS, Department of Treasury, Washington,
D.C., Apr. 9-11, 1986, at 2-3 [hereinafter Statement Before IMF] (stating that pro-
gress on the debt situation suggests that debtor nations will eventually realize their
aspirations of development); Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 78-79 (written response
of William Taylor, Director, Division of Bank Supervision and Regulation, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board) (claiming that Latin American countries
have made sufficient progress and concluding that loans to them are not uncollectible);
see also Bennett, The Intricacies of Bank Accounting, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1984, at
D10, col. I [hereinafter Bennett, The Intricacies of Bank Accounting] (stating that
banks continue to believe that they will eventually recoup their earnings, that debtor
countries will repay, and that the government would never allow major banks to fail).
Progress occurred primarily because the developing countries expressed a willingness
to establish adjustment programs and the United States economy improved substan-
tially. Id. Secretary Baker further stated that debtor countries could meet their obliga-
tions if they strictly followed a recovery plan. Id. Baker also indicated that substantial
reductions in both short- and longer-term interest rates since early 1985 should reduce
debt service payments for developing countries by S 11 billion or more annually. Id.
Secretary Baker also noted that during 1986 and 1987 developing nations would face
the best external economic environment since the early 1970s, providing a solid founda-
tion for their own efforts to strengthen growth. Id.
Other statistics demonstrate that trade positions of developing countries have been
improving sharply. Statement of James A. Baker, III, Before the Joint Annual Meeting
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, TREASURY NEws, Depart-
ment of Treasury, Washington, D.C., Oct. 8, 1985, at 2, reprinted in Documentation
Concerning Development and International Debt Issues, 25 I.L.M. 412, 413-14 (1986)
[hereinafter Statement of James A. Baker, Oct. 8, 1985] (emphasizing increased ex-
ports, economic growth, and reduced aggregate current account deficits in developing
nations).
Other commentators, however, contend that the trade positions of developing coun-
tries will decline due to external developments including an increase in United States
interest rates, a slowing of the United States economy, or continued low oil prices.
Sargen, supra note 7, at 542; see also Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 14-15, 20
(noting that oil price decreases from 1982 to 1985 harmed Mexico and other oil export-
ing countries); Asman, Free Market Theories Become Public Policy in Ecuador, Wall
St. J., Apr. 11, 1986, at 27, col. 3, (quoting Victor Eastman, Vice President of the New
York Central Bank, as stating that for every one dollar decrease in the price of oil, the
annual export revenues of Ecuador decrease $60 million).
16. Meissner, supra note 7, at 621 (stating that banks have not resolved the crisis).
Rather than solving the crisis, banks learned how to manage it, allowing the debt crisis
to remain a problem for a long time. Id.
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debtor countries. 7 Since 1984, banks have issued additional loans only
to enable the debtor nations to repay interest on existing loans.18 In
1984, for example, the United States Treasury Department, in conjunc-
tion with the World Bank and the IMF, found it extremely difficult to
arrange a successful loan package between debtors and creditors to pre-
vent Argentina from defaulting on its loans.' Some of the same diffi-
culties recurred in 1986 when Mexico needed to reschedule its loans. 0
Therefore, the optimism of the United States Treasury Department
and the United States banks in connection with the international debt
crisis is not warranted.
17. See B. BALASSA, supra note 9, at 112-16 (showing that United States foreign
investment in Latin American countries decreased from $38.8 billion in 1980 to $28.0
billion in 1984 despite a pattern of increased foreign investment in other developing
nations since 1978); Sargen, supra note 7, at 542 (stating that voluntary lending to
Latin American countries has not reached previous levels or levels that are necessary to
maintain their economies); Statement of James A. Baker, Oct. 8, 1985, supra note 15,
at 3 (stating that lending to debtor nations has declined, with very little net new lend-
ing anticipated); Statement Before IMF, supra note 15, at 8 (asserting that both do-
mestic and foreign investment had fallen significantly in 1986 and 1987, and that for-
eign direct investment in developing countries declined from 20% of total flows in 1975
to only 11% in 1984); Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1984, at 33, col. 2, cited in Bogdanowicz-
Bindert, supra note 9, at 531 (noting the statement of the president of the World Bank
that new money from commercial banks, including smaller regional banks, is an un-
likely prospect); Rowen, $1 Trillion in Debts, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1986, at A27, col. I
[hereinafter $1 Trillion in Debts] (stating that of the 15 countries on United States
Treasury Secretary Baker's list of troubled debtor countries, only Mexico seemed likely
to receive significant new private loans in 1986); Trade Deficits Tied to Debt Crisis,
supra note 13, at H7, col. 4 (commenting that loans have fallen far short of the level
Treasury Secretary Baker contemplated in his well publicized debt initiative of October
8, 1985).
18. Needham, Banks Must Acquire Equity in Debtor Countries, Wall St. J., Sept.
30, 1983, at 31, col. 3 (noting that as long as debtor nations borrow money primarily to
repay existing loans, banks will never attain the real solution to the debt crisis, namely
capital formation that provides goods and services for international commerce); cf.
Lekachman, supra note 11, part IV, at 3, col. 3 (observing that banks that have over-
extended assets in irresponsible loans should convert loans debtor nations cannot repay
into gifts); Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 9, at 529 (citing the increasing reluctance
of regional banks in the United States to continue lending to debtor nations).
Banks rarely lend to Latin American countries as a safe investment. Id. The nine
major United States foreign lending banks have lent 179% of their shareholders' equity
and have little choice but to continue lending because without additional funds, coun-
tries will default on their existing loans. See id. (noting that the major United States
banks have already invested too much in these countries to discontinue lending now).
Brazil, as a case in point, used 80% of its borrowed money for debt service in 1983.
Needham, supra, at 31 (showing that Brazil used 80 cents of every dollar it earned to
service its $90 billion debt thereby typifying the difficulty of debtor nations when they
reconcile economic growth with debt repayment).
19. L.A. Times, June 3, 1984, part IV, at 5, col. 3.
20. Cf. Statement Before IMF, supra note 15, at 2 (suggesting that if debtor na-
tions acceded to the "Baker Plan" to resolve the debt crisis, the resulting demand ex-
ports from debtor nations would reduce nominal and real interest rates, thus alleviating
the crisis).
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Some experts conclude that the Latin American debtor nations will
never repay all their outstanding loans, or at best will repay the loans
long into the future.21 It is unlikely that these countries will continue to
impose economic hardships on their nationals to maintain a favorable
credit rating with the United States banks.2 Even if the Latin Ameri-
can countries do experience the miraculous economic recovery that the
United States Treasury Department and the banks predict,23 they will
not have enough funds to satisfy all their debt obligations. 2' In light of
this pessimistic outlook, United States banks must act to ease the bur-
den of their loans to Latin American countries because legislative and
regulatory attempts to solve the Latin American debt crisis have not
succeeded.25
21. See, e.g., Rowen, Citicorp's Bold Move, Wash. Post, May 22, 1987, at Fl, col.
5 [hereinafter Citicorp's Bold Move] (stating it is unlikely that much of Latin
America's $400 billion debt will ever be paid off); Rout, Postponement of Third World
Debts Threatens Upheaval, Financial Collapse, supra note 11, at 35, col. 2 (discussing
the continuing threat that heavily indebted countries will simply walk away from their
debts); $1 Trillion in Debts, supra note 17, at A27, col. I (quoting French Economy
and Finance Minister Edouard Ballador's concern that some debtor countries may
collapse).
22. Biggs, Legal Aspects of the Latin American Public Debt: Relations with the
Commercial Banks, 25 CEPAL REV. 163, 164 (1985). Current Latin American debt is
similar to the German debt after World War I in that "there is a limit to the amount
of financial resources a country can transfer abroad without seriously upsetting the
living standards of its population and its social and political organization." Id. at 168.
Indeed, the main reason Latin American countries feel obligated to pay their debts is
not a legal rule, but their intentions to borrow again. Id. (quoting P. EINzING, ROL-
LOVER CREDITS 49 (1973)).
23. See Bennett, The Intricacies of Bank Accounting, supra note 15, at DI0, col. I
(indicating the positions and predictions of United States banks); Statement of James
A. Baker, Oct. 8, 1985, supra note 15, at 3 (indicating that the Treasury Department
and the United States banks are optimistic about the resolution of the debt crisis);
Statement Before IMF, supra note 15, at 3-4 (providing optimistic predictions about
the future of Latin American economies). But see Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1986, at El0,
col. 1 (noting that finance nMinisters of several developing countries have limited expec-
tations for the economies in their own countries).
24. Rowe, Mexico, Banks Agree on Loan Terms, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1986, at GI,
col. 2 (stating that positive effects from improved economic conditions take time to
yield results). Considering the lag time associated with the recovery of the economies of
Latin American countries, it seems unlikely that most debtor countries will soon make
interest payments. Id.
Current high interest rates make it implausible that the debtor countries will ever
repay all of their loans or even a very large fraction of them. Lekachman, supra note
11, part IV, at 3, col. 3. Even if debtor nations meet bankers' terms in the 1980s loan
restructuring, the same problems probably will recur in the 1990s. See Sargen, supra
note 7, at 542 (observing the increasing importance of past issues as the 1980s debt
restructuring leads to a bunching of amortization payments of developing countries in
the 1990s); see also Gall, Games Bankers Play, supra note 7, at 172 (documenting the
possibility that developing nations may fail to meet their debt obligations and conclud-
ing that eventual default is not a "probability" but an "inevitability").
25. Cf. New Controls on Global Debt, supra note 1, at 437 (stating that the Act
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION ACT
OF 1983 AND THE REGULATIONS ESTABLISHED UNDER
ITS AUTHORITY: AN ATTEMPT TO DECREASE THE RISK
OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS
In response to the international and Latin American debt crises,
Congress enacted the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983.20
The legislators who enacted ILSA intended to control, regulate, and
supervise loans to developing debtor countries.2 These legislators also
hoped to guarantee a moderate flow of lending to debtor nations, rea-
soning that a strangulation of lending would doom the development and
growth of debtor nations and create an economic crisis. 8 In practice,
the regulatory agencies seem more concerned with guaranteeing a flow
of capital to the debtor countries than with promoting and enforcing
rules of banking conduct. 9
The Act authorizes the three major bank regulatory agencies, the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), to increase their supervision and regulation of private banks
with international loans.30 Through ILSA, the United States legislators
and regulators intended to increase their control over banks with inter-
national loans. The Act contains five provisions to supervise and regu-
late private lending abroad.31 These provisions include special risk
reserves, accounting rules on loan fees, disclosure rules, capital ade-
quacy requirements, and requirements for special project loans.32
provides little substantive regulatory reform and even less of a solution to the interna-
tional debt problem). But cf. Responsible Foreign Lending, supra note 1, at 208-13
(stating that the Act includes some effective provisions that reduce the risks associated
with country default).
26. ILSA, supra note 1, §§ 3901-3912
27. Id.
28. See Senate Hearings on International Debt, supra note 5, at 13 (noting Sena-
tor Heinz's concern that strict regulations on lending could cause debtor nations to
reduce their imports and therefore decrease the exports of other countries); id. at 49
(statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury) (stating that regulations on
lending are necessary, but if not instituted in moderation, could compound the adjust-
ment and liquidity problems of debtor nations); id. at 241 (statement of Paul A.
Volcker, Chairman, Federal Reserve System) (arguing that strict regulations could en-
courage retreat from lending and leave debtor nations without money to improve their
economies and pay back loans).
29. See Review of LSA, supra note 2, at 14, 16, 20 (showing the concern among
officials from bank regulatory agencies of continuing a flow of capital to Latin Ameri-
can debtors).
30. ILSA, supra note 1, §§ 3901-3908.




A. PROVISIONS FOR SPECIAL RISK RESERVES
Members of Congress and officials of the bank regulatory agencies
perceived that banks with large international loans often overstated the
value of these loans on their books.33 ILSA, therefore, requires banks to
establish special reserves for foreign loans that experience a high risk of
nonrepayment 3 4 The Act delegates to the regulatory agencies the au-
thority to promulgate specific reserve requirements.36 ILSA directs the
bank regulators to require banks to establish special reserves whenever
a foreign borrower exhibits no definite prospects for restoration of its
debt or whenever the quality of the assets of a bank are impaired due
to the inability of the debtor to pay its debts.3 The Act prescribes
three factors to determine whether bank assets are impaired from non-
payment of a debtor: (1) the failure of a debtor to make full interest
payments; (2) the failure of a debtor to comply with the terms of a
restructuring plan; or (3) the failure of a debtor country to comply with
an IMF or other adjustment program.37 Banks may not include these
special reserves as either income or capital and surplus for other regu-
latory and accounting purposes. 38 The Act requires banks to maintain
the reserves at levels sufficient to protect against potential loss.39
The three federal regulatory agencies simultaneously established
identical guidelines to implement the provisions of ILSA for special
reserves. To satisfy special reserve requirements banks must create Al-
33. Senate Hearings on International Debt, supra note 5, at 59 (statement of C.
Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency). The regulators alleged that banks over-
stated the value of their foreign loans with protracted repayment difficulties. Id. The
Comptroller of the Currency stated that banks should decrease the value of such assets
rather than carry them on their books at full value. Id. The Chairman of the FDIC,
William Isaac, agreed and contended that banks should set up reserves against particu-
larly risky loans. Id. at 388 (statement of William Isaac). These reserves would make
earnings statements, capital accounts, and dividend policies more realistic. Id.
34. ILSA, supra note 1, § 3904(a)(1), (c).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 3904(a)(1)(A).
37. Id. § 3904(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), (B).
38. Id. § 3904(a)(2). The regulations promulgated after ILSA retain this language.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(c)(1), 211.43(c)(1), 351.1(b)(3)(1) (1986) (prohibiting banks
from including charges to current income as capital or surplus). Along these lines, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has stated that these rules do not preempt
accounting procedures and securities laws requiring other reserves of bank holding
companies. See SEC Staff Says Bank Loan Risk Reserve May Not Satisfy Federal
Securities Laws, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 247 (Feb. 3, 1984) (report-
ing that banking institutions may have to establish reserves in excess of present regula-
tory levels). The regulations also state that banks shall not combine these special
reserves with other reserves to meet the requirements. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8 (c)(2),
211.43(c)(2), 351.l(b)(3)(ii) (1986).
39. ILSA, supra note 1, § 3904(b).
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located Transfer Risk Reserves (ATRRs)40 or alternatively "write-
down" the value of the loan.4 The regulations simply require a bank to
set aside a certain amount of money every time it lends to a heavily
indebted Latin American country.
The reserves protect the bank in the event a debtor country defaults
on its loan. If a debtor nation fails to repay its loans, the special
reserves allow a bank to have a sufficient amount of money set aside to
prevent the bank from collapsing.42 The ATRRs affect bank earnings
because they require banks to hold money that they otherwise could
invest or lend for a profit.48 The provisions protect stockholders of bank
securities and the overall economy more than they protect depositors
because depositors are insured through the FDIC or a state banking
insurance company.
The regulators retain the authority to determine which loans require
the special reserves, the amount of the reserves, and when the banks
must establish them.44 The regulatory agencies use factors the Act
prescribes for special reserves45 to determine whether a bank loan re-
40. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8, 211.43, 351.1 (1986). The regulations define "transfer risk"
as "the possibility that an asset cannot be serviced in the currency of payment because
of a lack of, or restraints on the availability of, needed foreign exchange in the country
of the obligor." Id. §§ 20.7(h), 351.1(a)(4).
In anticipation of these regulations, most banks with loans to countries experiencing
protracted debt problems voluntarily established such reserves as of late 1983. Am.
Banker, Dec. 19, 1983, at 2, col. 4.
41. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(c)(4), 211.43(c)(4), 351.1(b)(3)(iv) (1986).
42. Bennett, The Intricacies of Bank Accounting, supra note 15, at D10, col. I
(stating that reserves are a necessary safeguard against the uncertainty surrounding
banks' huge foreign loan portfolios).
43. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 13 (statement of William Taylor, Direc-
tor, Division of Bank Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) (describing the ATRRs as a prescribed formula to write down loans).
The ATRR process "permits an orderly adjustment in carrying value for transfer risk
to those countries where economic adjustment has not been followed or has not been
successful." Id.
44. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(b)(i)-(iii), 351.1(b)(2)(A)-(C) (1986). The amount of the
reserves depends on the circumstances of each case. Id. § 20.8(b)(2)(ii). Unless special
circumstances apply, the reserves will comprise at least 10% of the loan in the first year
and 15% in following years. Id. §§ 20.8(b)(2)(ii)(B), 211.43(b)(2)(ii)(B), 351.1(b)-
(2)(ii)(B)(2). It is also possible to reduce the amount of the reserves. Id. The proper
level of the loan loss reserves is a subjective judgment that includes, among other fac-
tors, a "bank's loan loss history, concentrations within the loan portfolio, management,
and economic variables." Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 80-81 (written response of
William Taylor, Director, Division of Bank Supervision and Regulation, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System). In 1986, the ATRRs varied in amount between
30 and 90% of outstandings to the countries subject to the ATRRs. Id. at 91 (written
response of Robert R. Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency). The regulators
review the ATRR amounts annually and generally increase them 15% per year, but
they can decrease them depending on the borrowers' condition. Id.
45. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (outlining the three factors regulators
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quires ATRRs.48 These legislatively prescribed factors suggest that the
regulators could have required several banks with loans to various
Latin American countries to set aside money in the ATRRs. The regu-
latory agencies, however, have required banks to establish ATRRs for
loans made only to seven debtor nations.47
While Congressional committees debated the Act, officials from the
regulatory agencies indicated that the agencies would enforce these
provisions rigorously.48 At that time, many commentators anticipated
that these statutes and regulations would have a great impact on the
lending practices of United States banks. 49 The banks, however, es-
caped strict application of these provisions because the regulators have
not rigorously required the special reserves.50 Although all of the Latin
American countries experienced severe debt situations, the regulators
required ATRRs initially for only Nicaragua and Bolivia. 1 The regula-
tions immediately affected only three non-Latin American countries:
Sudan, Poland, and Zaire.52 Since the initial determinations, the regu-
lators have added only two countries to that list, bringing the total to
use when determining if banks must establish special reserves).
46. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(b)(2)(A), (B), 211.43(b)(2)(A), (B), 351.1(b)(2)(ii)(A)(l),
(2) (1986). Subsequent conduct of the regulators indicates that they have further de-
fined the three factors. The following factors are now controlling: (1) nonpayment of
interest for six months; (2) noncompliance with an IMF program; and (3) failure to
satisfy rescheduling terms for over one year. Review of ILSA supra note 2, at 91 (writ-
ten response of Robert R. Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency).
47. Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 91-92 (written response of Robert R. Bench,
Deputy Comptroller of the Currency) (stating that as of June 25, 1986, loans to seven
countries required ATRRs and that it is illegal for the regulators to publicly disclose
the names of these countries).
48. See Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems: Hearing on S. 502
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 32, 56-59 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on Proposed Solutions to International
Debt Problems] (statement of C. Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency) (setting
forth the position of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and outlining a five-
point program designed to increase the supervision of international lending).
49. Lending to Foreign Nations, supra note 1, at 728 (stating that the ATRR pro-
visions would have a marked impact on the lending policies of several United States
banks); Am. Banker, Feb. 28, 1984, at 2, col. 2, cited in Mitchell, supra note 1, at 2
(stating that ATRRs are punitive and would discourage further lending to Third World
nations).
50. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 3; see also Review of ILSA, supra note 2,
at 2 (opening statement of Senator Heinz) (noting that Poland obviously needs the
reserves).
51. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 3; Bennett, Fed Seeks US. Bank Write-
Offs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1983, at DI, col. 5 [hereinafter Fed Seeks Write-Offs];
Rowe, Fed Rule Allows 3d World Loans to Continue, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1984, at D3,
col. 1 [hereinafter Fed Rule]; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 2, col. 2.
52. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 3; Bennett, Fed Seeks Write-Offs, supra
note 51, at DI, col. 3; Fed Rule, supra note 51, at D3, col. 1.
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seven. 53 In addition, banks have devised activities that allow them to
avoid the requirements.5 The decisions of the regulators to add addi-
tional countries to the list are confidential, but the banks often volunta-
rily disclose the regulators' decisions. In 1986, the reserves varied from
85 percent of the loans for one country to 15 percent for another. 5 At
that time, the reserves increased for some countries, but no reserves
had decreased. 6 At year end 1985, these reserves totaled $2.4 billion, 17
and the nine largest banks in the United States held $1.5 billion of this
total.58
B. ACCOUNTING RULES ON BANK FEES
The Act authorizes regulators to restrict bank service fees in excess
of administrative costs for restructuring or rescheduling loans.5 The
Act allows banks to charge such "front-end" fees only if the banks rec-
ord the fees as income over the life of the loan rather than as income in
53. Compare supra note 51 and accompanying text (indicating in 1983 that prob-
lem loans from five countries required ATRRs) with Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at
27 (indicating that in 1986 problem loans from seven countries required ATRRs). At
least one commentator indicates that regulators required banks with problem loans
from Peru to establish ATRRs for these loans. Sterngold, Peru May Resume Debt
Payments, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1986, at A36, col. 4. But cf. Riding, Foreign Banks
Eager for Debt Talks with Peru, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1985, at A28, col. 1 (noting that
banks could write-off loans from Peru without harming themselves).
54. See infra notes 97-226 and accompanying text (discussing the means banks use
to manage the current Latin American debt crisis and avoid the regulations promul-
gated after ILSA). These activities include rescheduling existing loan agreements, syn-
dicating bank loans, swapping international loans, and engaging in debt-equity swaps.
Id.
55. Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 22-23 (statement of Charles Collier, Assis-




59. ILSA, supra note 1, § 3905 (a)(1); see Hearing on Proposed Solutions to In-
ternational Debt Problems, supra note 48, at 30, 51-52 (statement of Paul A. Volcker,
Chairman, Federal Reserve Board) (describing service fees that act as charges imposed
on borrowers in addition to interest charges as "up-front" fees or "front-end" fees);
Mendez, Recent Trends in Commercial Bank Lending to LDCs: Part of the Problem
or Part of the Solution?, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 173, 186 (1982) (noting that
banks usually charge fees in addition to charging interest upon granting new loans or
restructuring or rescheduling an existing loan); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 2 n.24
(describing these fees as common when banks arrange a loan, increase the yield on a
loan, syndicate a loan, or commit funds for a fixed period of time).
A consortium of banks from different countries, including the United States, Japan,
and West Germany, usually transacts major loans to developing countries. Ellis, A
Look at What's Behind the Rising Cost of the World's Developing Countries, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 11, 1983, at 9, col. 1. A lead bank represents and manages the
consortium. Id. The lead bank charges the borrowing country a management fee to
cover costs and earn a profit. Id.
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full when the loan is created.60 Prior to the enactment of ILSA, record-
ing these fees as income in full upon creation of the loan was the com-
mon method of accounting.61 The new rule limits the ability of banks
that lend to foreign debtors to receive the short-term benefits of includ-
ing the "front end" fees as immediate income on their books.0 2 At first
glance, the fees make balance sheets appear profitable, but they hide
banks' overexposure and increase the risk that debtors will not repay
their loans.63
Under the regulatory agencies' guidelines for service fees, banks may
continue to record as income their fees for administrative costs of
originating, restructuring, or syndicating an international loan." The
Act specifically identified these costs with negotiating, processing, and
consummating the loan.65 Included among these costs are legal fees,
costs of preparing and processing loan documents, and an allowable
portion of salaries.66 The Act specifically excludes supervisory and ad-
ministrative expenses as well as occupancy and other similar overhead
costs. 67 Banks must amortize these latter fees and expenses over the life
of the loan rather than record the fees as income at the beginning of
the loan period.6 Despite the regulatory guidelines, banks could con-
tinue to receive substantial fees for their services to debtor countries
60. ILSA, supra note 1, § 3905(a)(1).
61. See Hearing on Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra
note 48, at 60 (statement of C. Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency) (stating
that the accounting method that uses "front-end" fees creates a deceptive short-term
appearance of increased income); H.R. REP. No. 175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1983),
reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1898, 1925 [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 175] (stating that a system spreading the fee over the life of the loan should
replace this common accounting method); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 2, col. 2 (stating
that prior to ILSA, banks often considered "front-end" fees as income in full when
received).
62. See Hearing on Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra
note 48, at 60 (statement of C. Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency) (stating
that there is an incentive to take advantage of the deceptive short-term appearance of
increased income that "front-end" fees can provide); H.R. REP. No. 175, supra note
61, at 1898, 1925 (stating that using the fees as income over the life of the loan is a
more realistic accounting approach).
63. Ellis, supra note 59, at 9, col. 1.
64. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.9(c), 211.45(c), 351.2(d) (1986) (requiring banks to account
for the administrative costs of an international loan as the costs are incurred). The
accounting profession adopted the accounting guidelines "with only modest changes."
Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 13 (statement of William Taylor). Whereas these
fees averaged 11/% in 1983, they only averaged ,i% in 1986. Id.
65. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.9(c)(2), 211.45(c)(2), 351.2(d)(2) (1986).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 97-225 and accompanying text (observing how banks continue
to receive substantial fees for services to debtor nations and continue to avoid ILSA
regulations).
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because they can classify their services as negotiating, processing, or
consummating loans.69 Indeed, regulatory officials praise the new ac-
counting rules because they are not an impediment to "international
loan reschedulings" or "new project loans in certain countries. '70 In
addition, the accounting rules have very little effect on banks that al-
ready had in place policies similar to the new ILSA provisions.1
C. INCREASED DISCLOSURE OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING DATA
The Act requires banks to increase their disclosure of international
lending data 2 and authorizes the banking agencies to promulgate regu-
lations regarding disclosure and reporting requirements.73 The Act also
requires banks with foreign country exposure risk to submit quarterly
reports to the federal regulatory agencies74 and make figures on its for-
eign loans available to the public.7 5 Frequent disclosures allow deposi-
tors and investors to assess the degree of diversification and risk in-
volved in bank investment portfolios.76 The Act, therefore, requires
banks to disclose their loans more frequently. Legislators believed that




Initially, the regulatory agencies added very little to the language of
69. See Ellis, supra note 59, at 9, col. 1 (commenting that banks are making sub-
stantial profits by levying higher interest rates and charging high fees for the
rescheduling of existing debts that developing countries cannot repay).
70. Review of lLSA, supra note 2, at 18 (statement of Robert R. Bench, Deputy
Comptroller of the Currency). But see id. at 38 (statement of Carleton R. Haswell,
Senior Vice President, Chemical Bank) (stating that few sovereign loan negotiations
between 1985 and 1986 had "front-end" fees, not because the regulations prohibit
them, but because the negotiations tended not to require them).
71. See id. at 38 (statement of Carleton R. Haswell, Senior Vice President, Chemi-
cal Bank) (criticizing the accounting fee regulations because even very small loan fees
require amortization, creating expensive accounting costs for banks).
72. ILSA, supra note 1, § 3906(a).
73. id.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 3906(b).
76. Hearing on Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra note 48,
at 28.
77. Id.; see also Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 18 (reviewing the provisions of
ILSA, including the disclosure provisions). One bank official recently praised the new
disclosure requirements: "As a result of ILSA, more frequent, accurate, and useful
information about U.S. banks' international activities is now available to bank manage-
ment, bank supervisors, the markets, and the general public." Id. at 18 (statement of
Robert R. Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency); see also id. at 43 (statement
of Karen Lissakers, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, Columbia University)
(noting that although increased disclosure inhibits the maneuverability of banks on the




the Act. The agencies simply determined that changes to existing re-
porting forms could satisfy the new quarterly reporting procedures. 8 In
1986, however, the regulators strengthened the reports, "requiring im-
proved data on banks' international risk distribution, trade credits and
off-balance sheet activities."' 19
D. CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS
The Act authorized regulatory agencies to establish capital adequacy
requirements to guard against the risk of a debtor nation's default.80 In
the past, the regulators subjected banks involved in international lend-
ing to less stringent capital adequacy requirements because the banks
were able to diversify their portfolios. 81 The Act underemphasized this
78. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.10(b), 211.44(b), 351.3(b) (1986) (adopted Feb. 13, 1984).
Lawyers specializing in banking law report that currently, banks must file a new two-
part summary, the Country Exposure Information Report (CEIR). Mitchell, supra
note 1, at 2, col. 2 (noting that the CEIR is required as an attachment to the Country
Exposure Report that banks must file quarterly).
The CEIR "requires disclosure of information on lending exposure in countries
which have borrowed the equivalent of greater than one percent of a bank's total assets.
For exposures ranging from 0.75 percent to one percent of a given institution's total
assets less detailed information is required." Id. According to the bank regulators, "the
reports include data on the banks' longest exposures" and are available for public view-
ing under certain circumstances. Review of lISA, supra note 2, at 18 (statement of
Robert Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency). In 1984, 190 banks engaged in
lending that would require them to file the CEIR under these recent regulations. FED.
REs. WK., Jan. 9, 1984, at 5, cited in Mitchell, supra note 1, at 2, col. 2 n.22. In some
cases, a number of banks voluntarily disclosed more information than is required.
Witcher, Big Bank's Latin Debt Figures Underscore Potential Danger From Huge
Write-Offs, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1984, at 33, col. 4. [hereinafter Latin Debt Figures]
(reporting that the SEC required banks to disclose foreign loans in excess of one per-
cent of their total assets and the amount of delinquent loans classified as nonaccruing
in countries where loans exceed one percent).
79. Review of lISA, supra note 2, at 18 (statement of Robert Bench, Deputy
Comptroller of the Currency). The regulators also shortened the dissemination time for
coordinating the disclosure statements and publishing aggregate country exposures. Id.
at 38 (statement of Carleton R. Haswell, Senior Vice President, Chemical Bank). The
aggregate country exposure publications are essential for banks to "keep track of what
is going on in the market place." Id.
80. ILSA, supra note I, § 3907; see also Minimum Capital Ratios, Issuance of
Directives, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,207, 10,215 (1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1986))
[hereinafter Minimum Capital Ratios] (recognizing that the benefits of increased capi-
tal levels outweigh the costs). Some of the predicted benefits of the capital adequacy
requirements include the following: (1) an increased capacity to withstand losses asso-
ciated with the risks of banking; (2) increased stability in the financial system; and (3)
increased capacity to fund economic growth. See id. at 10,215 (disclosing the new capi-
tal adequacy requirements).
81. H.R. REP. No. 175, supra note 61, at 45, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1898, 1928.
Prior to ILSA, banks needed to maintain a minimum capital-to-assets ratio of only
five percent. Federal Reserve System, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,317, 30,318 (1984); Schierl,
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advantage because some legislators and regulators believed this diversi-
fication may have added to the problem. 2
The regulatory agencies did not issue a final ruling with regard to
capital adequacy requirements until 1985.s The new regulations re-
quire banks to maintain total capital equal to at least 6 percent of ad-
justed total assets and primary capital equal to at least 5.5 percent of
adjusted total assets. 4 The regulatory agencies realized that the new
requirements would not have a significant impact on a substantial num-
ber of banks because most banks had already established capital re-
quirements exceeding the new levels.8 5 Increased capital levels, how-
International Banking: Risk Reserves for International Loans, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J.
271, 272 n.10 (1985) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1983)) (providing the guidelines appli-
cable to domestic and multinational banks since 1983).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 175, supra note 61, at 46, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1898, 1929 (stating that diversification did not remove the
number of troubled loans on accounts of banks); see also Senate Hearings on Interna-
tional Debt, supra note 5, at 147 (statement of Martin P. Mayer) (underscoring the
value of diversification because separate borrowers within one country still depend on a
single source of dollars to meet their obligations).
83. Capital Maintenance, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,218, 11,131 (1985) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 325.6 (1986)) [hereinafter Capital Maintenance] (promulgating the FDIC
capital adequacy requirements); Minimum Capital Ratios, supra note 80, at 10,209
(providing OCC capital adequacy requirements); Capital Maintenance, supra, at
16,058 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225 app. A (1986)) (setting forth the Federal Reserve
Board's requirements); see also Holland, Foreign Bank Capital and the United States
Federal Reserve Board, 20 INT'L LAW. 785, 809 (1986) (reporting that the FDIC and
the OCC did not promulgate a final rule until March 11, 1985, and that the Federal
Reserve Board approved its rules on April 24, 1985).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1986); see also Rosenstein, FDIC Raises Capital Ratio Re-
quirements, Am. Banker, Feb. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 4 (interpreting the new capital ratio
requirements); FDIC and OCC Adopt New, Uniform Capital Requirements, Wash.
Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 449 (Mar. 18, 1985) (interpreting the new rules).
The regulatory agencies deemed these regulations necessary because of the peculiar
problems that several banks faced in making foreign loans. Am. Banker, Nov. 4, 1983,
at 3, col. 3, cited in Mitchell, supra note 1, at 2 n.7. The regulations, however, are
aimed at banks that may or may not have substantial international loans. Review of
ILSA, supra note 2, at 23 (statement of Charles Collier, Assistant Director, Division of
Bank Supervision, FDIC). Some of these peculiar problems include the following: (1)
the absence of bankruptcy laws in many foreign nations; (2) the absence of public
security markets; (3) the relative difficulty United States lenders have in effecting a
change of management in a foreign business; (4) the potential for intra-bank conflict
between the foreign office initiating a loan and the domestic bank office supervising the
loan; and (5) the use of current value accounting and other unfamiliar methods not
conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Id.
ILSA also authorized the OCC to implement and enforce capital directives that re-
quire particular banks to increase their capitalization. ILSA, supra note 1, § 3907.
With regard to this authorization, the OCC has noted that "it is a useful supervisory
tool and has been used in cases where a bank's level of capital is an immediate and
overriding concern." Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 19 (statement of Robert R.
Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency).
85. Minimum Capital Ratios, supra note 80, at 10,215 (stating that nearly all
small banks had already met the requirements).
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ever, have allowed banks to cushion some of the shock associated with
the Latin American debt crisis after 1982.6 For the most part, banks
have "increased their capital by half since 1982 while LDC lending has
remained fairly constant. 18 7 These levels are higher than the minimum
guidelines the regulators promulgated"" and are higher than the levels
foreign regulators require of their banks.8 9
E. REQUIREMENTS FOR APPROVAL OF SPECIFIC PROJECT LOANS
The Act requires banks to prepare an economic feasibility evaluation
and to receive approval from a senior official of the banking institution
for any project loans exceeding $20 million.90 Under ILSA, banks must
prepare foreign loan valuations of large loans granted to "finance pro-
ject loans for various types of mineral or metal operations, outside of
the United States." 91 Representatives of the appropriate federal bank-
ing agencies review the evaluation when they perform examinations of
the banks.92 Legislators and regulators included these provisions be-
cause banks did not properly review the reasons for foreign loans or the
viability of the projects they funded. 3
The provisions of the Act concerning specific project loan approval
require very little regulatory action. Congress arguably enacted the
provisions as a protectionist measure for certain failing industries in the
United States that compete with similar industries in the developing
countries.94 The requirements for specific project loans have had little
86. See Cline, A Quick Fix that Would be Harmful, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1987,
sec. 3, at 2, col. 3 (noting that the risk to the international banking system was lower in
1987 than in 1982 because of increased capital adequacy and loan loss reserves).
87. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 1, 4 (Chart I) (recognizing ILSA as the
reason for increased capital levels of banks).
88. See id. at 11-12 (statement of William Taylor, Director, Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (stat-
ing that in 1986, capital, including amounts for loan loss reserves, increased 20% from
levels existing on December 31, 1983); see also id. at 19 (statement of Robert R.
Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency) (providing figures for the increases in
capital from 1982 to 1986).
89. See id. at 38-39 (statement of Carleton R. Haswell, Senior Vice President,
Chemical Bank) (criticizing the current system because foreign banks can compete
more easily when their regulators require lower capital adequacy levels).
90. ILSA, supra note 1, § 3908(a)(1).
91. Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 39 (statement of Carleton R. Haswell, Senior
Vice President, Chemical Bank).
92. ILSA, supra note 1, § 3908(b).
93. H.R. REP. No. 175, supra note 61, at 44-45, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1898, 1927-28.
94. See Lending to Foreign Nations, supra note 1, at 733-34 (suggesting that pro-
tectionism prevailed because Congress never articulated a motive for the provision and
because strong labor unions represent the industries affected).
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impact on the banks."' As one bank representative stated in 1986,
"[g]iven the poor economic situation in most of the LDCs and low
world commodity prices, the demand for new project loans has come to
a standstill." '
III. HOW BANKS ARE COPING WITH THE CURRENT
LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS AND AVOIDING THE
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AFTER ILSA
To deal with the new statute and regulations, banks developed activi-
ties and transactions that allow them to cope with the crisis and often
avoid the new rules under ILSA. Some of these activities and transac-
tions include: increasing loan loss reserves, rescheduling existing loan
agreements, conducting bank loan syndications, swapping and selling
loans, and conducting debt-equity swaps. All of these activities appear
to eliminate problems associated with the Latin American debt crisis.
A. ATTEMPTS By BANKS TO DEAL WITH NEW RULES REGARDING
ALLOCATED TRANSFER RISK RESERVES (ATRRs)
The new rules regarding loan loss provisions do not harm bank earn-
ings, but set far reaching precedent on how regulators will evaluate
loans to major foreign debtors.97 Establishing special reserves has the
same effect on a bank's records as writing off a loan as uncollectible. 8
95. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 39 (statement of Carleton R. Haswell,
Senior Vice President, Chemical Bank) (noting that few project loans are extended to
debtor countries).
96. Id.
97. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 2. The process that the regulators conduct
when reviewing bank loans for possible ATRRs also imposes high costs on the banks
involved. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 37 (statement of Carleton R. Haswell,
Senior Vice President, Chemical Bank) (noting that the regulatory process requiring
banks to complete questionnaires and conduct meetings, cost Chemical Bank $368,000
between 1985 and 1986).
98. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 2. When a debtor nation will not repay
loan principal, a bank must write-off a loan. Write-offs do not have a direct effect on
earnings, but they reduce the bank's loan loss reserves, which banks must maintain at
adequate levels. Bennett, The Intricacies of Bank Accounting, supra note 15, at Dl,
col. 2, DIO, col. 1. The banks make quarterly provisions to the loan loss reserves. Id.
Banks charge this amount against earnings, but eventually the banks must replenish
the reserve because banks charge losses against it. Id. This replenishment decreases
earnings of the bank for that quarter. Id. When a bank believes it will not receive more
than half the value of a loan, it charges an appropriate amount against its loan loss
reserves, thereby writing-off the loan in whole or in part. Id.
To avoid especially sharp declines in earnings, some banks sold undervalued bank
assets or used other past gains to offset recent higher loan loss provisions. Hertzberg,
Major Banks Avoid Big Loan Write-Off but Sharply Boost Their Loss Reserves, Wall
St. J., Oct. 18, 1984, at 7, col. 2. For example, Security Pacific Corporation used a $76
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Banks, however, criticize the special reserves. They claim that under
the process the regulators use to determine the ATRRs, "the Bank is
not informed ahead of time about the recommended level of the ATRR
or proposed classification or the logic as to how these recommendations
were reached." 99 Banks also claim that they are uncertain about which
loans to particular countries will require the ATRRs in the future and
therefore are reluctant to lend further amounts to heavily indebted
countries.'
Peer pressure has compelled banks to increase general loan loss
reserves.101 Indeed, many major banks voluntarily increased their loan
loss reserves above the required levels or established these reserves
before the regulations were promulgated. 0 2 Banks would rather estab-
lish special reserves for problem loans than write them off, and banks
use this tactic to protect earnings that would decrease if they wrote off
the loans.'
In 1986, major banks reported increased net earnings and lower loan
loss provisions because they previously established large reserves.' 04 In
1987, however, major banks and regional banks, following the actions
of Citicorp, substantially increased their loan loss reserves.' These
million gain from the sale of its headquarters building in Los Angeles, Chase Manhat-
tan Corporation used $49 million of settlements from law suits in 1982, and Manufac-
turers Hanover Corporation sold securities carried on its books at low values to record
high earnings in 1984. Id. Profitable lending activity, therefore, is not the only contrib-
uting factor to the success of a bank. Id.
99. Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 37-38 (statement of Carleton R. Haswcll,
Senior Vice President, Chemical Bank) (arguing that the regulations should include
the banks more directly in the ATRR decision-making process).
100. Id.
101. Hertzberg, supra note 98, at 7, col. 2.
102. See id. (finding that in 1984, Security Pacific Corporation increased its
reserves by 42% to $155 million, Manufacturers Hanover Corporation increased its
reserves $30 million, and Chase Manhattan Corporation increased its reserves $50 mil-
lion). Banks voluntarily established special reserves in anticipation of the new ATRR
regulations. Am. Banker, Dec. 19, 1983, at 2, col. 4; see also Bennett, The Intricacies
of Bank Accounting, supra note 15, at D10, col. 3 (stating that several banks created
reserves when public confidence in their earnings reports declined).
103. Bennett, The Intricacies of Bank Accounting, supra note 15, at DI0, col. 1.
But see Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 74 (written response of William Taylor,
Director, Division of Bank Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System) (indicating that most banks accept a partial charge-off rather
than establish a specific reserve).
104. Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1986, at El0, col. I (reporting that the net earnings of
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation rose five percent in the third quarter of 1986 be-
cause required loan loss provisions were lower than in past years).
105. See Banking Gamble: Citicorp Sharply Lifts Loss Reserves, Putting Its Ri-
vals on the Spot, Wall St. J., May 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter Banking Gamble]
(reporting that Citicorp added $3 billion to its foreign and domestic loan loss reserves);
Continental Bank Adds to Reserves, Wash. Post, June 23, 1987, at E8, col. 1;
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bank actions received mixed comments concerning the effect the ac-
tions will have on the overall Latin American debt crisis. These in-
creased reserves could resolve some of the problems associated with the
crisis. First, the reserves are an indication that banks are finally recog-
nizing, in a constructive manner, that their loans to heavily indebted
nations are risky."0 6 Second, the increased reserves allow banks to ven-
ture into innovative lending transactions such as debt-equity swaps
without fear of incurring substantial losses.' 7 Third, the reserves allow
banks to lend more funds to countries that are performing on their fi-
nancial obligations. 08 Fourth, the conduct "is a positive step toward
restoring confidence in U.S. banks"'1 9 and shows a "sign of strength"
in the United States banking industry." 0 Finally, establishing reserves
can create "peer pressure" among other banks encouraging them to
establish similar loan loss reserves, thereby improving the overall
strength of the banking industry."'
The increased reserves, however, could create problems for debtor
countries. First, after increasing reserves, banks are in a better condi-
tion to declare a country in default or write off a loan to a country and
BankAmerica Raising Reserve $1.1 Billion; Manufactures Hanover Mulls Similar
Step, Wall St. J., June 9, 1987, at 3, col. 1; Truell & Guenther, Chase Increases Loan
Reserve by $1.6 Billion, Wall St. J., May 28, 1987, at 2, col. 1; Weiner, Continental
and Bank of New York Post Losses, Am. Banker, July 16, 1987, at 2, col. 2; Security
Pacific Posts $172 Million Loss, Am. Banker, July 17, 1987, at 2, col. 2; Weinstein,
Bank of Boston Loses $83 Million with Loan-Loss Reserve Increase, Am. Banker, July
17, 1987, at 2, col. 2; 3 Banks Add to Loss Reserves, Wash. Post, June 30, 1987, at
E3, col. 6; Sugawara, Riggs Boosts Loan Reserves; Expects Loss, Wash. Post, July 1,
1987, at G1, col. 3.
106. Banking Gamble, supra note 105, at 1, col. 6; Swardson, Citicorp Will Lose
$2.5 Billion, Wash. Post, May 20, 1987, at Al, col. I [hereinafter Citicorp Will Lose
$2.5 Billion]; see also Citicorp's Bold Move, supra note 21, at Fl, col. 5 (recognizing
that more is necessary to resolve the debt crisis than simply following the Baker Plan).
107. Swardson, Citicorp Move Brings New Era, Wash. Post, May 21, 1987, at Fl,
col. 3 [hereinafter New Era]; see also Berg, U.S. Banks Swap Latin Debt, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 1986, at D4, col. 1 (recognizing that banks can sell their loans at a loss or
forgive principal after taking large loan losses); cf. Banking Gamble, supra note 105, at
22, col. I (quoting a top banking official as claiming increased reserves will allow Cit-
icorp to participate in creative new investment mechanisms).
108. Banking Gamble, supra note 105, at 22, col. 1.
109. Citicorp Will Lose $2.5 Billion, supra note 106, at Al, col. 3 (quoting Sena-
tor Bill Bradley).
110. Rowe, Bank's Decision Seen as Sign of Strength, Wash. Post, May 21, 1987,
at Fl, col. 3 (noting that increased reserves will make Citicorp's earnings in the future
far less vulnerable to debtor countries' economic and political setbacks); Rowen, Fresh
Ideas for Debt Crisis, Wash. Post, June 7, 1987, at HI, col. 1 (noting that increasing
reserves demonstrate that banks are in a much better financial position than they were
in 1982).
111. See supra note 105 (indicating some of the banks that followed Citicorp's lead
to increase loan loss reserves and take substantial losses to earnings in 1987).
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thus place themselves in a more powerful negotiating position when
they reschedule existing loans or establish terms for new loans. 1 2 Sec-
ond, the new reserves can cause concern outside the banking industry,
and lead investors to believe the banking industry is not "sound. 113
Third, increased reserves do not, by themselves, restore growth to Latin
America. 1 4 Fourth, increased reserves can cause prices of debtor coun-
try loans on the secondary market to decrease, thereby decreasing the
return a bank receives when it sells or swaps its loans. " 5 Finally, the
increased reserves might lead banks to decrease their lending to in-
debted countries because banks are better able to withstand the shocks
associated with a country failing to service its debt after lending
ceases.
116
The actions of major banks to increase loan loss reserves appear to
have more of a beneficial impact than the ATRRs. The regulators ini-
tially required banks to establish ATRRs for only two Latin American
countries: Nicaragua and Bolivia. 1 The regulatory agencies chose
those countries because they demonstrated a protracted inability to re-
112. New Era, supra note 107, at Fl, col. 3; Banking Gamble, supra note 105, at
22, col. 1; cf. infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (recognizing that banks enjoy
a superior negotiating position over debtor countries attempting to negotiate favorable
terms in a rescheduling agreement). But see New Era, supra note 107, at F4, co. I
(noting that Brazilian officials and Citicorp officers claim the increased reserves will not
change relations between, or the positions of, Brazil or Citicorp).
113. Banking Gamble, supra note 105, at 22, col. 1.
114. See Citicorp Will Lose $2.5 Billion, supra note 106, at Al, col. 3 (quoting
Senator Bill Bradley); see also Weiner, Swearingen Caps His Continental Career, Am.
Banker, Aug. 12, 1987, at 24, col. I (quoting John Swearingen as saying increasing
reserves is not enough to resolve the problems banks experience with the international
debt crisis); Review of LSA, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Senator Heinz) (noting
that when banks establish reserves or write down loans, debtor countries do not benefit
because such activity does not reduce their debt burden).
115. See Forde, Regional Banks Move to Cut LDC Debt, Am. Banker, Aug. 12,
1987, at 2, coL. 1 (noting that prices of LDC debt on the secondary market decline as
banks set aside funds in loan loss reserves). Indeed, debtor countries may wonder why
they should service loans that the banks have already recorded as a loss and are selling
for less than 100% on the secondary market. Samuelson, Debt Strategy Adrift, Wash.
Post, June 3, 1987, at G1, col. 4 [hereinafter Debt Strategy Adrift].
116. Truell, Reserve Moves Are Likely to Slow Efforts for New Argentine Loans.
Bankers Say, Wall St. J., May 29, 1987, at 2, col. 3 (noting that banks are reluctant to
join in new loan packages to Argentina after witnessing Citicorp and Chase Manhattan
Corporation establish huge reserves for similar types of loans); Debt Strategy Adrift,
supra note 115, at GI, col. 4 (noting that the banks are disengaging and do not want to
make new loans or provide leadership in the debt crisis).
117. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 3; Fed Seeks Write-Offs, supra note 51,
at Dl, col. 5; Fed Rule, supra note 51, at D3, col. 1; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 2, col.
2. After this initial determination, the regulators added loans from two other countries
to this list. See supra note 53 (comparing the number of countries whose loans required
ATRRs in 1983, to the number in 1985). Peru was one of the countries added to the
list in 1985. Id.
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pay their debts, or they demonstrated that no definite prospects for an
orderly restoration of their payments existed.118 Even though the regu-
lators will find it difficult not to apply the same provisions to countries
in similar economic situations,119 the special reserve requirement does
not affect most Latin American nations that are working actively with
the IMF.'20 The Federal Reserve Board has no foreign relations func-
tions, but the Federal Reserve Board arguably enacted these provisions
with some political motives. 12' None of the countries immediately af-
fected had a close political relationship with the United States. Fur-
thermore, these requirements had little effect on United States banks
because banks issued only small loans to most of these countries and
had already substantially written off the loans. 22 If the regulators had
required banks to set aside substantial reserves for countries such as
Mexico, Argentina, or Brazil, both United States banks and the world
economy would have suffered drastically. a23 Thus, the regulatory agen-
cies are reluctant to apply reserve rules to major borrowers because
their application could harm major creditors. 24 Furthermore, these
major foreign borrowers may experience economic improvements that
118. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
119. Id. (quoting Institute for International Economics analyst William R. Cline).
120. Id. Because Argentina worked closely with its lenders to reschedule its debt,
regulators did not require banks with loans extended to Argentina to meet the ATRR
requirements. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 2, col. 2. Indeed, if banks had not rescheduled
loans to Argentina at the last moment, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, the largest
lender to Argentina, would have lost earnings of $35 million to $80 million. Bennett,
The Intricacies of Bank Accounting, supra note 15, at D1 0, col. 2.
In 1983, Mexican and Argentine borrowers made escrow payments in pesos to their
central banks, which did not have dollars to make loan payments to the United States
banks, and regulators allowed the banks to treat the payments not yet received as cur-
rent income. Gall, supra note 7, at 186.
121. See Fed Seeks Write-Offs, supra note 51, at DI, col. 5 (noting that political
motives were involved in restructuring the foreign debt of Argentina).
122. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 3; Fed Rule, supra note 51, at D3, col. 1;
see also Review of lISA, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Senator Heinz) (claiming
that the countries requiring the ATRRs are "absolutely dead in the water"); id. at 43
(statement of Karen Lissakers, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, Columbia
University) (noting that the regulators applied ATRRs to only a few countries with
very small amounts of loans). The required reserves accounted for less than six percent
of the 1982 pre-tax portfolios of the major United States banks. Wall St. J., Dec. 27,
1983, at 2, col. 3 (quoting Institute for International Economics analyst William R.
Cline); see also Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 22-23 (statement of Charles Collier,
Assistant Director, Division of Bank Supervision, FDIC) (reporting that the ATRRs
ranged from 85% to 15% of the loans to different countries in 1986 and totaled only
$4.1 billion in 1983).
123. See Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 3 (stating that similar requirements
for loans to Brazil or Mexico would be extremely costly).
124. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 103 (written response of Charles Col-
lier, Assistant Director, Division of Bank Supervision, FDIC) (assuring Senator Heinz
that a premature ATRR requirement would harm both the debtor and the creditors).
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special reserve requirements might frustrate.12 5 Applying reserve provi-
sions more broadly would also limit further lending to the major debtor
countries.126 A decrease in lending to these countries would frustrate
IMF programs and prevent major debtor countries from paying their
debts.127
Banks remain reluctant to write-off their troubled foreign loans, 28
but are very willing to increase their general loan loss reserves . 2 9 The
regulatory agencies, however, continue their reluctance to require spe-
cial reserves for other troubled Latin American countries.' ° Indeed,
125. Id.
126. Fed Rule, supra note 51, at D3, col. 1; Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 43
(statement of Karin Lissakers, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, Columbia
University) (noting that the regulators would rather allow banks to continue the flow of
funds to enable troubled debtors to continue servicing their debts than impose ATRRs
on loans to debtors).
127. Fed Rule, supra note 51, at D3, col. I (stating that placing Brazil and Mexico
on the special reserve list would cause banks to cease lending to them); see also Fed
Seeks Write-Offs, supra note 51, at D1, col. 5 (stating that placing Brazil and Argen-
tina on the special reserve list would create political ramifications that the federal regu-
lators prefer to avoid); Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 43 (statement of Karen Lis-
saker, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, Columbia University) (noting that
ATRRs could frustrate the "solution" to the debt problem that banks, the IMF, and
regulators have adopted).
128. Latin Debt Figures, supra note 78, at 33, col. 4 (showing that most United
States banks remain reluctant to write-off their loans to Latin American countries); cf.
Gall, supra note 7, at 184 (showing that West German and Japanese banks frequently
write-off a majority of their unsound foreign loans).
129. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text (showing how banks volunta-
rily increased loan loss reserves in 1987).
130. See Witcher, U.S. Bank Regulators Issue Directive Likely to Cut Profits,
Wall St. J., June 26, 1985, at 5, col. I [hereinafter Regulators Issue Directive] (stating
that the regulatory agencies would not require banks to establish reserves on their loans
to Peru); Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 27 (reporting the Deputy Comptroller of
the Currency's statement that banks must be protactively delinquent six months or
more and not in compliance with IMF or bank advisory committee programs to require
ATRRs); see also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (indicating that loans
from only seven countries require the ATRRs). The OCC reports:
only seven countries have fallen within that degree of severe delinquency and
severe inability to restructure their debts. A number of other countries have been
close to that, but then have made the decisions to negotiate successfully with
bank advisory committees or agreeing with the IMF on standby programs, and
have not gone across that threshold of 6 months or more delinquency and inabil-
ity to deal with the Fund.
Review of ISA, supra note 2, at 27. The regulators will require ATRRs in the future
if the six month delinquency period limitation is not met and if the country fails to
negotiate an IMF or bank advisory committee program. Id.; see also id. at 74-75 (writ-
ten response of William Taylor, Director, Division of Bank Supervision and Regulation,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (noting that risks of some loans
are insured better with general loan loss reserves and increased capital than specific
ATRRs).
Rather than require ATRRs, the regulators place loans to many debtor Latin Ameri-
can countries in the category of Other Transfer Risk Problems (OTRP). Id. at 86-88
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the regulators are encouraging banks to make additional loans to coun-
tries that already require ATRRs. 131 The regulators indicate that these
additional loans do not require ATRRs 3 2 because the countries in-
volved are pursuing constructive structural adjustment policies. 133 In
summation, as bank regulators have noted, "it is unlikely that reserve
requirements have had any significant effect on banks' decisions to lend
to 'ATRR' designated countries. 1 34 Banks, however, appear reluctant
to lend to countries that do not already require ATRRs because the
regulators do not indicate which countries they will add to the list in
the future.13 5 The activities of banks in increasing loan loss reserves,
rather than the ATRR provisions in ILSA, thus appear to have a bene-
ficial impact on the Latin American debt crisis.
B. RESCHEDULING EXISTING LOAN AGREEMENTS
For banks to avoid the ATRRs or writing off their loans to Latin
American countries and for Latin American countries to avoid default-
ing on their loans, creditor banks and debtor nations often must
reschedule, restructure, or refinance existing debts.' 36 The reschedul-
(written response of Robert Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency) (indicating
that loans from debtors whose payments are interrupted but who take positive actions
to restore debt service fall into the category of OTRP). The OTRP designation is not
part of the ATRR requirement, but regulators use it when determining the required
level of a particular bank's capital adequacy and loan loss reserves. Id. at 28 (state-
ment of Charles Collier, Assistant Director, Division of Bank Supervision). This classi-
fication does not appear to negatively affect banks' decisions to lend to countries with
loans in the OTRP category. Id. at 24.
131. See Review of lLSA, supra note 2, at 58-59 (written response from William
Taylor, Director, Division of Bank Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System) (noting that the additional loans the regulators encourage
are trade credits that carry a classification below substandard).
132. See id. (noting that the regulators do not automatically require ATRRs for
countries with previous loans requiring ATRRs).
133. See id. (noting that countries following the Baker Initiative often avoid addi-
tional ATRRs for new loans).
134. Id. at 24 (statement of Charles Collier, Assistant Director, Division of Bank
Supervision, FDIC) (noting that the ATRRs have at least required banks to recognize
losses that they might otherwise have deferred). But see id. at 38 (statement of Carle-
ton R. Haswell, Senior Vice President, Chemical Bank) (claiming that banks are reluc-
tant to lend even small amounts to countries because they fear the regulators will re-
quire additional reserves for the new loans).
135. See id. at 53 (noting that lenders are not lending to LDCs because the regula-
tors might suddenly require special reserves or write-offs for the loans).
136. Biggs, supra note 22, at 176. Restructuring or rescheduling usually involves
delaying or extending interest payments or reducing the amount of a specific obliga-
tion. Id. Refinancing, however, defines the new package as a separate transaction that
replaces the original one and generally allows banks to charge a higher interest rate
and loan fee. Id. Banks prefer refinancing for their more favorable terms, as impending
default drastically reduces the debtor country's bargaining power. Id. Banks have suc-
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ings allow banks to satisfy the requirements necessary to avoid
ATRRs. 3 7 In the reschedulings, banks take advantage of the bargain-
ing positions they maintain over debtor nations that are on the brink of
default, use every bargaining tool at their disposal to extract large sums
from the debtors, then cover unpaid amounts with new loans. Banks
negotiate the new loans to avoid write downs on old loans that would
decrease bank profits. "3 ' The superior bargaining position of banks al-
lowed them to avoid linking the rescheduled loans of Mexico to the
drop in the price of oil" 9 and extract tremendous profits.140 Reschedul-
ing requires banks temporarily to forego principal payments, but banks
offset this disadvantage when they raise interest rates in most of the
refinancing agreements.1M  The banks also extract high fees for
rescheduling, and ILSA's accounting rules on bank fees do not affect
many rescheduling fees.
Major debtor nations -eceived better conditions in debt restructuring
cessfully imposed refinancing onto debtors to make loans profitable for the banks. Id.
Twenty-five countries with an aggregate debt of $250 billion rescheduled their fi-
nancing terms in 1983. Poniachek, U.S. International Lending and the Latin American
Market, BANKER'S MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 12, 14, cited in Comment, International
Loan Syndications: The Next Security, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 169-70 n.79
(1984) [hereinafter International Loan Syndications]. In late 1984, banks rescheduled
$95 million of bank credits, representing more than one quarter of outstanding bank
credits to LDCs. Sargen, supra note 7, at 539.
Most of the major debtor nations rescheduling loans with United States banks are in
Latin America. Meissner, supra note 7, at 615; see generally Clark, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Parity of Treatment Between Equivalent Creditors in Relation to Com-
parable Debts, 20 INr'L LAW. 857, 859 (1986) (describing how banks and debtor na-
tions negotiate the loan restructuring process).
137. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 27 (noting Robert R. Bench, the Dep-
uty Comptroller of the Currency, as saying that ATRRs are not necessary for banks
that negotiate successfully with bank advisory committees or the IMF before a six
month delinquency period expires).
138. See Time for Banks to Write Down Loans, supra note 10, part 11, at 5, col. I
(criticizing the conduct of major banks as damaging to both creditors and debtors);
International Loan Syndications, supra note 136, at 170 (stating that the good bar-
gaining position of banks allows them to receive tremendous profits); Biggs, supra note
22, at 175 (stating that banks use their resources to great advantage when renegoti-
ating debt payments).
139. $i Trillion in Debts, supra note 17, at A27, cl. 1.
140. See Witcher, Banks Criticized for Increasing Profits from Countries with
Debt Difficulties, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1983, at 32, cal. 2 (noting that stiffer repayment
terms on postponed debt provides tremendous profits to banks, but that rescheduling
loans may also produce negative consequences for major lenders if debtors ultimately
default).
141. Bleakley, Waiting for the Big Banks to Revive, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, at
F10, col. 4 (stating that rescheduling permits banks to do well even during the debt
crisis).
142. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text (analyzing the new accounting
rules for loans to debtor countries).
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than minor ones. 143 Nicaragua, however, probably negotiated the best
conditions for a developing country. 4 Recent reports indicate that
commeicial banks may move toward more constructive negotiating
positions.4 5
Banks only recently demonstrated reluctance to issue new loans in
restructuring agreements. 46 Contributing to the reluctance of banks
are doubts over the prospects for repayment, the unwillingness of the
World Bank to guarantee any loan packages, and increased demands of
the debtor nations in the negotiation process. 4 7 Because large banks
are reluctant to continue rescheduling these loans, they increasingly
call on regional banks to contribute funds. 48
A debtor country's failure to comply promptly with the terms of its
rescheduling package undermines the confidence of the major banks
and creates anxiety in the banking community. One only has to remem-
ber the shock that surrounded the temporary failure of negotiators to
renegotiate a loan package for Argentina in 1984, 49 to appreciate the
problems that could result if a debtor nation fails to negotiate a
rescheduling agreement. Rescheduling is one of the few means of
avoiding a country default; therefore, banks must overcome their reluc-
143. See Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 9, at 529 (noting that the IMF limited
assistance to smaller debtors that are obtaining outside financing).
144. See Biggs, supra note 22, at 178 (noting that Nicaragua received favorable
interest rates upon restructuring its entire foreign debt).
145. See Watson, Keller, & Mathieson, International Capital Markets: Develop-
ments and Prospects 23 (Aug. 1984) (IMF Occasional Paper No. 31), cited in Sargen,
supra note 7, at 539 (stating that commercial banks recently provided lower fees and
longer repayment terms to LDCs than in the past).
146. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (reporting on the reluctance of
banks to continue lending to Latin debtors).
147. See $1 Trillion in Debts, supra note 17, at A27, col. 1 (stating that Mexico is
the only country likely to receive significant new commercial bank loans in 1986);
Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1986, at F7, col. 5 (showing that in its package in 1985 the World
Bank gave a guarantee only to Chile).
148. See Gall, supra note 7, at 184 (noting that regional banks enter rescheduling
agreements for political reasons). But cf. Rowe, National Bank of Washington Joins in
Mexico Rescue Loan, Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at El, col. 4 (stating that regional
banks are also becoming weary of lending more to Latin American debtors). Regional
banks reluctantly helped restructure loans with Brazil only for political reasons and
warned the major banks they will not participate in other loan restructuring. Id. The
National Bank of Washington helped restructure Mexico's debt only because it feared
that Mexico would default without assistance, and because the IMF and the World
Bank participated in the restructuring process. Id.
149. See Kraft, It is Time for American Banks to Act, L.A. Times, June 3, 1984,
part IV, at 5, col. 3 (noting that several nations restricted loans with Argentina so
Argentina could meet its deadlines for interest payments). As Argentina neared its
deadline for interest payments, Mexican authorities worked quickly with Colombia,
Venezuela, Brazil, the United States, and the banks to organize a loan. Id.
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tance to reschedule.15 Additionally, banks may have to make changes
in the restructuring process before they can solve the debt crisis.151
C. BANK LOAN SYNDICATIONS
Bank loan syndications are another innovation banks use to avoid the
problems associated with the Latin American debt crisis. Syndicated
loans are single agreements between a debtor, a lead bank, and a bor-
rower. In a syndicated loan, all lenders in the agreement are in privity
with the debtor country, even though the terms of one syndication
agreement limit the rights of each lender.
1 5 2
Syndicated loans attract United States banks for several reasons.
First, the lead bank can fulfill its clients' needs and earn a fee on the
entire amount of the loan, without actually lending all of the money
required. Second, participating banks can diversify their loans and
avoid the regulations regarding ATRRs and disclosure that are estab-
lished, in part, according to the amount a bank loaned to particular
countries. Third, less sophisticated lenders in the syndicate, such as
smaller regional banks, can indirectly use the analysis of the larger,
more sophisticated banks in the syndicate. Fourth, several lenders and
a borrower create a working relationship, thereby making future deals
possible for the two parties. Finally, when a borrower has separate
loans from many different banks, the debtor is less likely to default
because it would harm several lenders rather than a few and undermine
the debtor nation's prospects for future loans.53
150. See WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 10, at 465-71 (stating that rescheduling
debt has a vital role in solving the crisis); Biggs, supra note 22, at 175 (stating that the
only option is renegotiation because converting loans into tangible assets that banks
could attach if a borrower defaults is not a legally feasible solution).
151. See Biggs, supra note 22, at 177 (stating that the loan returns to haunt both
parties almost immediately because the time scale in renegotiations is too short). But
see Ellis, supra note 59, at 9, col. 1 (stating that competition among banks and bank
officers' fears that the debtors will default are the main reasons that reschedulings ex-
clude longer repayment time periods).
152. See In re Yale Express Sys., 245 F. Supp. 790, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), cited in
International Loan Syndications, supra note 136, at nn.14-15 (describing a participa-
tion loan, in which only the original bank or lead bank, is in privity with the borrower
and able to enforce the loan). In a participation loan, each purchasing lender buys a
right to a specific percentage of the payments that the lead bank collects. International
Loan Syndications, supra note 136, at 158-59; see also Goodman, Syndicated
Eurolending:. Pricing and Practice, I INT'L FIN. HANDBOOK § 3.4 (A. George & I.
Giddy eds. 1983) (exploring the market for syndicated credits and analyzing rationales
for its existence and rapid growth).
153. Cf. R. BEE, OFFSHORE LENDING BY U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS 83-84, 177-78
(F. Mathias 2d ed. 1981) (describing the intricacies of syndications); T. DONALDSON,
INTERNATIONAL LENDING BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 66-69 (1979) (providing informa-
tion on European syndications), cited in International Loan Syndications, supra note
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Syndicated loans also attract borrowers for several reasons. First, the
borrower has to approach the banks and negotiate only once, avoiding
the reputation of always needing loans. Second, the borrower can often
raise a greater amount of money through a syndication. Third, Latin
American debtor countries often suffer a financial position too weak to
enjoy alternative sources of capital.""
One fault of the syndications is that regional banks typically have
limited access to information about rescheduling the syndications in
which they participate.155 Regional banks are not usually included in
the committee that negotiates the rescheduling. 56 Regional bank of-
ficers often hear about decisions affecting them from the media rather
than having first-hand knowledge of these decisions. 5 7 Therefore, syn-
dications do contain some disadvantages for regional banks.
Furthermore, the syndication market does not guarantee repay-
ment,158 and a serious possibility of default remains. 159 Indeed, it is
likely that default is not a "probability" but an "inevitability."' 60 A
syndication will thus provide little security to United States banks if a
country defaults.' One certainty is that syndications allow banks to
avoid several provisions of ILSA because they reduce a bank's total
loans to a particular country below the level where the ILSA require-
ments would apply.
D. INTERNATIONAL LOAN SWAPS AND LOAN SALES
Loan swapping is another tactic banks use to avoid regulations re-
garding loan loss reserves and make their disclosure statements appear
136, at 161 (describing some of the advantages of syndications).
154. T. DONALDSON, supra note 153, at 68, cited in International Loan Syndica-
tions, supra note 136, at 161.
155. Id. at 71-76, cited in International Loan Syndications, supra note 136, at
173-74; Tinnin, The War Among Brazil's Bankers, FORTUNE, July 11, 1983, at 55,
cited in International Loan Syndications, supra note 136, at 173-74.
156. International Loan Syndications, supra note 136, at 173-74.
157. Tinnin, supra note 155, at 5 (recognizing the shortsightedness of banks for
entering the transactions so hastily); International Loan Syndications, supra note 136,
at 173-74 (stressing the dependence of regional banks on money center banks).
158. International Loan Syndications, supra note 136, at 169.
159. Gall, supra note 7, at 172. See generally Tinnin, supra note 155, at 50, 52
(discussing the Brazilian debt crisis); Quantius, Problems with International Loan
Syndications, BANKERS MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 18 (noting the complications in-
volved in loan syndications); Korth, The Management of International Lending Risk
by Regional Banks, 64 J. CoM. BANK LENDING, Oct. 1981, at 27 (discussing the ef-
fects of the likely default of Brazil).
160. Gall, supra note 7, at 184.
161. Cf. Korth, supra note 159, at 27 (discussing the effects of a likely default of
Brazil).
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more attractive. Loan swapping allows commercial banks to sell or
trade their loans on secondary markets where price fluctuations enable
banks to make substantial profits. 62 This activity is similar to the way
investors deal in securities and is often connected with a syndication or
rescheduling plan.163
The following example is the best description of how banks transact
these swaps. Bankers Trust Company, the eighth largest bank in the
United States, reduced its loans to Brazil by $100 million, ten percent
of its total to Brazil, with swaps to Banco Real, a Brazilian bank.,,' In
exchange for the Brazilian loans, Banco Real gave Bankers Trust loans
from other Latin American countries totaling $190 million, and Bank-
ers Trust paid Banco Real $90 million in cash, plus the $100 million of
its Brazilian debt.1 65 In the exchange, Bankers Trust received loans
that it considered more valuable than those it was holding.16 The Bra-
zilian loans were worth only $75 million to Bankers Trust at the pre-
162. Rowen, Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1986, at
A21, col. 1 [hereinafter Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?]. Swaps are not overly
important, but "they could be part of an overall economic reform so that dependence
on external financing is lastly reduced." Id.; see also Gavin, A GATTfor International
Banking?, J. WORLD TRADE L. 121, 128 (1985) (stating that when access to credit is
restricted, it is advantageous to have expertise in novel financing tools). Private United
States banks claim their Latin American loans are worth 100 cents on the dollar, even
though there is already a market where those loans are sold at discounts from 20% to
70% or more. Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, supra, at A21, col. 1.
Swapping and selling such loans at drastic discounts indicates that banks are finally
recognizing their loans to Latin America are worth considerably less than their listed
face value. See Sachs, It's the Right Time to Offer Real Relief, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9,
1987, sec. 3, at 2, col. 3 (indicating that many loans are worth 40% less than their face
value). In August 1987, international secondary markets sold a S100 claim on Brazil-
ian debt for only $55. Id. Indeed, in August 1987, the secondary markets valued the
external debt of Mexico at only 53 cents on the dollar, and listed Argentina at 47 cents
on the dollar, Venezuela and Chile at 67 cents on the dollar, Peru at 11 cents on the
dollar, and Bolivia at only 10 cents on the dollar. Id.
The declines in secondary market prices of loans to debtor countries are expected to
continue due to the increases many banks are making for their loan loss reserves. See
Forde, supra note 115, at 2, col. 1 (noting that after the loan loss allocations, balance
sheets more accurately reflect the true value of loan portfolios). Investors in secondary
markets may expect higher reserves to induce major banks to accept lower prices for
loans of debtor countries. Id.; see also Berg, Banks Study Strategies to Replenish
Reserves, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1987, at D4, col. 1 (noting that because banks have
already taken their losses, they can sell their loans at a loss in the secondary market).
163. See Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, supra note 162, at A21, col. 1
(describing loan swaps); A Hot New Market in Swapping High-Risk Debt, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 5, 1983, at 144 [hereinafter Swapping High-Risk Debt] (promoting loan swaps).
164. Swapping High-Risk Debt, supra note 163, at 144; Hector, The Banks' Latest
Game: Loan Swapping, FORTUNE, Dec. 12, 1983, at I11.
165. Hector, supra note 164, at 111.
166. Cf. id. at 111-12 (discussing loan swapping between Bankers Trust and Banco
Real and the resulting benefits to Bankers Trust).
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vailing discount rate.16 7 At that time, Banco Real found it difficult to
raise funds outside Brazil and immediately received $90 million from
the swap, which it could use for foreign or domestic lending.' 68 Bankers
Trust concluded the transaction when its Brazilian loans nearly became
"nonperforming assets" and thus avoided the ILSA regulations regard-
ing loan loss reserves.1 69 The assets acquired were also less likely to
require any reserves in the future. 17 0 Most loan swaps that United
States banks offer are only a small fraction of the swap offered in the
Bankers Trust case.'
7 '
There are several reasons why banks engage in loan swapping. First,
loan swapping allows participating banks to accept portions of the total
package with each portion maturing at terms suitable to differing pref-
erences of banks. Therefore, the desires of the debtor can weigh against
the desires of the individual lenders. 17 2 Second, loan swapping allows
the lender to decide if it wants to renew the loan.7 3 Third, banks can
reduce their loans to countries that appear unable to repay their loans
and make their balance sheets appear more attractive without taking
writedowns that Congress and some regulators demand. 74 Fourth, the
price of a loan on the secondary market is a good indicator to another
bank of the credit-worthiness of the country whose loan is being
swapped or sold.175 Finally, banks can completely remove their invest-
ments from some countries by swapping or selling their entire loan







172. Fox, Country Lending, Grass-Roots Style, INST'L INVESTOR, Oct. 1983, at 37.
173. Id.
174. Swapping High-Risk Debt, supra note 163, at 144. The federal regulators
require banks that loaned one percent or more of their total assets to any one country
to disclose the loans to their shareholders. Id. Several large New York banks swapped
debt to reduce their exposure to any country below one percent, in an effort to com-
pletely avoid the disclosure requirement. Id.
175. Cf. id. (discussing how the emerging market sets actual values for sovereign-
risk debt); Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 89 (written response of Robert R. Bench,
Deputy Comptroller of the Currency) (asserting that prices of loans on the secondary
market are not a good indication of the ability of a country to pay its debt). Some
argue the secondary market is "very imperfect." Id. The Deputy Comptroller, when
referring to the secondary market in 1986 indicated:
Volume is minimal; there is not breadth or depth to the market or a primary
market maker. There is also no homogeneity to the instruments being traded.
They vary by various characteristics. This demand and supply rests on various
factors, only one of which is an assessment of creditworthiness.
Id.
176. Swapping High-Risk Debt, supra note 163, at 144. Some banks sell their
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Regulators and bankers estimate that banks have swapped approxi-
mately $1 billion worth of loans and believe that the market is rapidly
expanding. 1 7 An informal secondary market already exists in London
where some loans sell at sixty cents on the dollar.178 Many of the loan
swaps originate with small financial institutions outside the United
States that want to divest their Latin American loans.17 9 Some banks
have exchanged what they view as risky loans to Brazil, Peru, Argen-
tina, and Mexico for safer loans to Spain, Portugal, and other more
stable European countries. 180 Some banks in the Middle East and Eu-
rope have made their entire Latin American loan portfolios available
for swaps.'
Some experts, however, argue that loan swapping is destructive be-
cause it allows banks to distort the purpose of the new rules on ac-
counting and disclosure.182 Swaps arguably do not eliminate the overall
debt problem because they do not create interest and principal pay-
ments for nearly bankrupt countries.183 The transactions, however, are
helpful in reducing risks associated with the Latin American debt crisis
because they allow banks to diversify their portfolios.
E. DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS
Another recent tactic United States banks use to manage the Latin
American debt crisis and avoid the new rules on accounting special
reserves for international assets is to exchange their loans (debt) for
stock in state owned corporations and industries (equity) or sell loans to
other lenders who then exchange the debt for equity. These transac-
tions are simply an extension of the debt swap and debt sale techniques
analyzed earlier. A growing number of United States banks, including
Citibank, Bankers Trust, Morgan Guaranty Trust,"" and several re-
Latin American loans at tremendous discounts to buyers who will trade those loans for
other debt. Id.
177. Id. But see Hector, supra note 164, at I ll (stating that Citicorp, usually as
innovative as most other major United States banks, was not swapping loans in 1983).
178. Gall, supra note 7, at 186.
179. Hector, supra note 164, at 111.
180. Swapping High-Risk Debt, supra note 163, at 144 (reporting that European
banks trade Latin American loans for Eastern European and African loans at losses of
20 to 30 cents on the dollar).
181. Hector, supra note 164, at 112.
182. Id.
183. See Swapping High-Risk Debt, supra note 163, at 144 (comparing loan swaps
to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic).
184. Rowe, Chile Shrinks Loan Size with "Debt Swaps" Scheme Allows Nation
to Convert Dollar-Based Loans into Peso Investments, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1986, at
HI, col. 2, H3, col. 4 [hereinafter Chile Shrinks Loan Size); see also Truell & Yang,
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gional banks18 5 are gaining expertise in debt-equity swaps.
There are two ways to transact debt-equity swaps.' s8 Most United
States bank transactions involve a third party who views the debtor
country as a less risky investment and purchases the foreign loan of this
nation from the United States banks.'8 7 The purchaser exchanges the
foreign loan of the debtor nations either for equity directly with the
debtor country in a state owned company that is going through priva-
tization or for domestic currency that the third party then uses to buy a
stake in a company, state owned or privately owned, in the debtor
nation.""
Fed Agrees to Let U.S. Banks Acquire Nonfinancial Firms in Debtor Nations, Wall
St. J., Aug. 13, 1987, at 20, col. 2 (reporting that Citicorp and Bankers Trust con-
ducted debt-equity swaps); Berg, Banks Generally Praise Fed's Third World Shift,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1987, at D2, col. 5 (reporting that officers at First Chicago
Corporation and Security Pacific Corporation praised regulations concerning debt-eq-
uity swaps and would continue to conduct swaps in Latin America); Citicorp Firm Will
Promote Debt Swaps in Venezuela, Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1987, at 16, col. 2 [hereinafter
Citicorp Firm Will Promote Debt Swaps] (reporting that Citicorp's Venezuelan unit
created a company that will promote debt-equity swaps in Venezuela). But see Schu-
bert, Trading Debt For Equity, THE BANKER, Feb. 1987, at 18 [hereinafter Trading
Debt for Equity] (claiming that many institutions are ill-equipped to manage the docu-
mentation, restructuring agreements, trade skills, and local contacts necessary to con-
duct debt-equity swaps).
185. See Forde, supra note 115, at 2, col. 1 (reporting that Mellon Bank swapped
loans for equity in an agricultural and industrial holding company in Chile, and Signet
Banking Corporation swapped loans for equity in various residual mortgage trusts and
servicing arrangements in Chile and Mexico); see also Trading Debt for Equity, supra
note 184, at 19 (noting that United States regional banks are ready sources for debt-
equity swaps in the secondary market).
186. See Regulation K: International Banking Operations, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,912
(1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5) [hereinafter Regulation K] (describing the
different forms of debt-equity swaps); Trading Debt for Equity, supra note 184, at 19-
20 (describing how debt-equity swaps work, particularly in Chile and Mexico); Hannon
& Gould, Latin America Swaps Debt for Equity, Bus. AM., (U.S. Dept. of Com., Int'l
Trade Admin.) Jan. 19, 1987, at 3-6 (outlining how debt-equity swaps are conducted in
Chile, Mexico, and Brazil); Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at HI, col. 4
(noting how debt-equity swaps are conducted, particularly with Chilean debt); Berg,
U.S. Banks Swap Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1986, at Dl, col. 1 [hereinafter
Berg, Latin Debts] (describing how debt-equity swaps work); Halliwell, Could Debt-
Equity Swaps Make Global Debt Manageable?, 76 A.B.A. BANKING J. 78, 84 (1984)
(describing how to conduct debt-equity swaps using an export trading company). The
regulators recognized a third type of debt-equity swap. Regulation K, supra, at 30,912.
The regulators indicate that when banks earn fees as brokers for other banks seeking
equity investments in developing countries, a debt-equity swap takes place. Id. Banks
would rather act as brokers for these transactions than sell their own loans because
selling a loan at a discount requires a bank to report a loss on its earnings statement.
Berg, Latin Debts, supra, at D5, col. 1. In addition, banks receive hefty fees for acting
as brokers. Id.
187. Cf. Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at Hl, col. 4 (noting the bene-
fits to United States banks from loan swapping).
188. See id. (describing debt-equity transactions of United States banks).
REVIEW OF lISA
Every party benefits from the swap. A bank or company that buys
the debt should profit because it buys the debt at a sizable discount.
This buyer considers the loans of the debtor country to be less risky
than the seller does. Buyers often can use more effectively the domestic
currency that they receive from the debtor country. A bank selling the
loan receives dollars, allowing it to make other investments, spread its
risk, and thus avoid the ATRR regulations if the loan sold is in arrears
for a considerable length of time. The debtor country gains a new in-
vestor to help stimulate production and employment. 8" United States
banks eager to decrease their exposure to debtor Latin American coun-
tries appreciate these transactions and sell their loans at substantial
discounts. 190
In another type of transaction, the lending bank itself accepts the
equity in a privatized state owned company or the domestic currency of
the debtor Latin American country, rather than selling the loan to a
third party that accepts the equity investment or foreign currency.
These transactions are common among banks located in other countries
and may become common to United States banks in the future."9 1 This
form of debt-equity swap allows the United States banks to avoid the
large writedown they experience when they sell their loans at a dis-
count. Stock ownership in potentially successful Latin American indus-
tries is preferable to defaulted loans. 9 2 In addition, it is better to trade
the loans for equity now rather than wait until the country defaults and
repays none of the money owed United States banks. 93 The Federal
Reserve Board in August 1986, released new regulations specifically
declaring debt-equity swaps legal in most circumstances.'9 " Further-
189. See Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, supra note 162, at A21, col. I
(describing the benefits for all parties of the swap); Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra
note 184, at H3, col. 1 (describing benefits to United States banks); Witcher, Vene-
zuela's Plan to Swap Debt for Bonds Worries its International Creditor Banks, Wall
St. J., July 16, 1986, at 26, col. I [hereinafter Witcher, Venezuela's Plan] (describing
benefits to debt-burdened countries).
190. See Witcher, Venezuela's Plan, supra note 189, at 26, col. 1 (stating that
banks are scrambling to perform debt-for-equity transactions as more debt-burdened
countries buy back their foreign debt at a discount).
191. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 35 (noting that non-United States
banks are using the financing alternatives).
192. See Needham, supra note 18, at 31, col. 3.
193. See Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, supra note 162, at A21, col. 1
(reasoning that it is better for the banks to suffer losses now on bad loans, in an organ-
ized way, than to wait for an avalanche of defaults later); Needham, supra note 18, at
31, col. 3 (showing the benefits of present debt-equity swaps over future defaults);
Orme, Favorable Debt Swaps Aid Mexico Investment, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1986, at
K6, col. I [hereinafter Favorable Swaps Aid Mexico] (outlining the benefits of Mexi-
can debt conversion).
194. Regulation K, supra note 186, at 30,912. Under the new regulations, a United
1987]
722 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 2:689
more, the Treasury Department encourages the debt-equity trans-
actions.'15
Debt-equity swaps also benefit Latin American debtor countries. The
transactions are easy to negotiate, with safeguards for sovereign control
established at the initial stages and participation in international trade
negotiated thereafter.196 Debt-equity swaps return flight capital to capi-
tal account deficit countries,19 stimulate "entrepreneurial dyna-
States bank may acquire 100% of the shares of a foreign financial company when (1) a
government is in the process of transferring the nonfinancial company from public to
private ownership (privatization); (2) the country where the nonfinancial company is
located is a "heavily indebted developing country;" (3) the shares of the company are
acquired through debt-equity swaps; (4) a bank holding company or its subsidiary
holds the shares; and (5) the acquiring bank divests the ownership interest within five
years from the date of acquisition, unless the Federal Reserve Board extends the period
another five years for good cause. Id. If debtor countries require the bank to invest new
money in the country in addition to the proceeds of the swaps, the regulators will ad-
dress such investments on a case-by-case basis. Id.
Countries that qualify include developing countries that have rescheduled their exter-
nal sovereign debt since 1980. Id. Under the new regulations, a bank holding company
may invest in a foreign company using existing debt through loans or equity under
existing procedures outlined in Regulation K. See id. (noting that under Regulation K,
banks may invest the lesser of $15 million or five percent of the capital of a bank
without prior regulatory consent).
The Federal Reserve Board requested and received the accounting standards applica-
ble to debt-equity swaps. Staff Memorandum concerning the Amendment to Regula-
tion K to permit certain investments through debt-for-equity swaps by U.S. banking
organizations to the Board of Governors (Appendix E, Accounting for Debt Equity
Swaps) (Aug. 7, 1987) (available at the Federal Reserve Board Freedom of Informa-
tion Office). These accounting issues were addressed recently in a draft practice bulle-
tin of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). See id. (sum-
marizing the new AICPA accounting standards for debt-equity swap transactions
issued on June 12, 1987).
195. See Statement Before IMF, supra note 15, at 8 (advocating that the swaps be
conducted more frequently to provide debtor countries with needed foreign investment);
Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, supra note 162, at A21, col. 1 (quoting J.D.
Whitehead, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, as saying that debtor countries are
already beset by much larger debt than their economies can support, and that one
answer to the debt crisis is finding ways of reducing that debt, and permitting debtors
to pay it off); Rowen, Baker Rejects Quick Fix on World Debts, Wash. Post, Dec. 5,
1986, at G5, col. 1 [hereinafter Baker Rejects Quick Fix] (quoting Treasury Secretary
Baker as saying debt-equity swaps provide opportunities for innovation); Statement by
the Honorable David C. Mulford, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S.
Treasury Department, Before the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade Annual
Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, printed in TREASURY NEWS, May 16, 1986, at 6 [hereinaf-
ter Mulford Statement, May 16, 1986] (available from the United States Treasury
Department) (indicating that debt-equity swaps reduce outstanding debt obligations
and return flight capital to indebted countries); see also Needham, supra note 18, at
31, col. 3 (stating that swaps have the blessing of the United States Treasury Depart-
ment and State Department).
196. See Needham, supra note 18, at 31, col. 3 (discussing methods of making
foreign banks' partial ownership of foreign corporations more palatable to Latin Amer-
ican debtor nations).
197. Mulford Statement, May 16, 1986, supra note 195, at 6 (noting that debt-
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mism,"' 198 increase efficiency, 199 and transfer technology and manage-
rial skills, each of which facilitates structural economic change and
growth. 00 Foreign investment is a major component to solving the
Latin American debt crisis, and debt-equity swaps create foreign in-
vestment that can help solve the debt crisis.20 1 Debt-equity swaps im-
prove the efficiency and resource mobilization capability of Latin
American domestic markets because they take advantage of the inves-
tor's foreign technology and entrepreneurial skills.20 2 Debt-equity swaps
also reduce the number of banks holding a particular country's debt to
those that desire a lasting relationship with that country, enabling
Latin American countries to establish financial ties with banks that are
most interested in their development. 0 3
Because these policies are essential to growth in the debtor countries,
Latin American countries should support debt-equity swaps.20' Foreign
and domestic investment has decreased in most developing countries in
recent years. 20 5 This reduction is one reason why the foreign external
debt has not subsided. Debt-equity swaps, however, can reverse this
equity swaps can provide the capital countries require to service their debts); see also
Trading Debt for Equity, supra note 184, at 19-20 (stating that swaps can provide a
significant economic boost to debtor countries).




202. Id. (calling for a "hospitable climate" for domestic and foreign banking insti-
tutions to improve the opportunities for the swaps).
203. See Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at H3, col. 4 (discussing the
benefits of Chilean debt swapping).
204. See Statement Before IMF, supra note 15, at 8 (noting the advantages of
Latin American debt swapping). Debtor nations need liquidity and financing if they are
to implement structural changes and increase investments in quick-yielding projects.
Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 9, at 531. Latin American countries will not benefit
from increased debt, and they will acquire more debt, unless they participate in these
types of refinancing transactions. Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, supra note 162,
at A21, col. 1. Any plan that merely involves more borrowing and interest payments is
not a total plan for success. Id. The Baker initiative stresses equity investment as an
important factor fostering growth in Latin American economies. Id.
205. See WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 10, at 182-83 (presenting figures and
graphs showing decreasing foreign direct investment); Statement Before IMF, supra
note 15, at 8 (stating that foreign direct investment in developing countries decreased
from 20% of total flows in 1975 to only 11% in 1984). See generally B. BALASSA, supra
note 9, at 111-16 (discussing the problems in Latin America associated with capital
flight and decreased foreign investment).
Some of the reasons for decreases in foreign direct investment are (1) the availability
of private commercial bank financing; (2) domestic retrenchment and capital flight; (3)
new restrictions and performance conditions of foreign investment; and (4) perceptions
of increased political risk and poor growth prospects as a whole. Statement Before
IMF, supra note 15, at 8.
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trend and promote development in Latin America." 6
A few Latin American countries have already started promoting
debt-equity swaps.20 7 Chile has extensive knowledge and experience in
debt-equity swap transactions.208 When Chile swaps commercial bank
debt for peso investment in its country, it reduces its interest payments
to United States banks and can apply the money to domestic invest-
ment and imports.2 0 9 Most banks with Chilean holdings are so anxious
to swap their holdings in that country that they will sell them for less
than face value to receive cash immediately. 10 Other investors who
view the situation in Chile as less precarious will buy these loans in
dollars at the discounted price and exchange them at the Chilean cen-
tral bank for their face value in pesos.2 11 An investor who buys the loan
can then obtain Chilean securities with these pesos. 2  Chile expects to
206. See Needham, supra note 18, at 31, col. 3 (defining capital formation that
produces goods and services for international commerce as the real solution to the
Latin American debt crisis).
207. Witcher, Venezuelas Plan, supra note 189, at 26, col. 1 (discussing a new
Venezuelan law authorizing the government to issue dollar denominated bonds for $7
billion that private Venezuelan businesses owe abroad); Citicorp Firm Will Promote
Debt Swaps, supra note 184, at 16, col. 2 (reporting that Venezuela began programs
for debt-equity swaps and debt capitalization); Needham, supra note 18, at 31, col. 3
(observing that Brazil has nearly 500 state owned enterprises that allow it to benefit
from debt-equity swaps); Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at HI, col. 3 (re-
porting that Chile encourages domestic and foreign investors to participate in debt
swaps); Bridges, Ecuador Will Seek Debt Refinancing, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1986, at
C4, col. 1 (noting that Ecuador intends to convert $100 million in dept-equity swaps in
1987); Favorable Swaps Aid Mexico, supra note 193, at K6, col. 1 (indicating that
although investment rules in Mexico are more strict than in Chile or Brazil, the Mexi-
can government still intends to retire $3 to $4 billion in foreign debt using the swaps);
Trading Debt for Equity, supra note 184, at 18 (noting that Argentina and the Philip-
pines established debt-equity programs, and Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Peru, and
the Dominican Republic are studying such programs).
Libra Bank, Ltd., a London based consortium bank, which Latin Americans acting
as middlemen partially own, offers Mexican investors options to buy Mexican govern-
ment loans at a fixed price during a specific period. Venezuelas Plan, supra note 189,
at 26, col. 1.
208. See Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at HI, col. 2 (reviewing the
ample experiences of Chile with debt swapping in 1985 and 1986); Trading Debt for
Equity, supra note 184, at 18-19 (indicating that the largest volume of swaps has oc-
curred in Chile, partially because its programs do not restrict opportunities for local
investors); Mulford Statement, May 16, 1986, supra note 195, at 6-7 (complementing
Chile for its movement toward promoting new transactions).
209. See Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at HI, col. 4 (describing the
benefits of the Chilean debt swapping program).
210. See id. (explaining the success of the Chilean Program).
211. See id. at H3, col. 6 (describing the types of lenders willing to participate in
Chilean debt swapping programs). Through June 30, 1986, Chile removed $450 million
from its outstanding debt of $19.5 billion. Id. at HI, col. 3.
212. See generally id. (discussing the ability of Chile to reduce interest payments
by converting dollar debt to peso investment).
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use these swaps more often, once it becomes more familiar with the
swaps and lenders become more familiar with Chilean programs." 3
In 1986, debt-equity programs converted about $1 billion in bank
loans to all debtor countries, and this trend should continue.21 4 Al-
though $1 billion is tiny compared to the total Third World debt of
$900 billion to $1 trillion,21 5 the small part of the loan it does eliminate
also cancels the interest on the debt.210 Because debt-equity swaps op-
erate on a small scale, they will not solve the entire Latin American
debt crisis. There simply are not enough investors to absorb all of the
loans to Latin American nations.1 7
Debt-equity swaps will not develop if banks continue to persuade the
World Bank and the IMF to "kick in" to pay off interest on old loans
of Latin American debtor nations and allow banks to reschedule loans
in more favorable terms.21 8 In addition, some banks are not interested
in looking at the long-term advantages these swaps provide because
earnings initially suffer in the short-term.219
Debtor countries may also attempt to avoid such transactions. The
swaps may imply "loss of control over national affairs," 220 or lack of
confidence in the debtor nation. 221 For the transactions to decrease the
amount of debt exposure a country maintains, the debtor countries
must also limit debt-equity swap use to foreign investors who can pro-
vide foreign currency from foreign sources.222 Some local investors
213. See generally id. (describing the recent acceleration of Chilean debt swapping
due to the increasing familiarity of Chile with the technique and investors' growing
familiarity with the Chilean programs). Francisco Graces, International Director of the
Chilean central bank, said Chile expects to convert an additional S550 million in for-
eign debt to domestic Chilean loans or investments by the end of 1986, which is more
than the country had converted in the 15 previous months. Id. These programs should
also work for Brazil because Brazil has nearly 500 state owned enterprises. Needham.
supra note 18, at 31.
214. See Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, supra note 162, at A21, col. 1
(discussing the increased use of debt swapping).
215. Id.
216. See Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at HI, col. 2 (associating re-
duced Chilean interest payments to foreign lenders with its ability to use export earn-
ings for domestic investment).
217. See id. at HI, col. 2 (asserting that debt swapping alone cannot solve the debt
crisis).
218. See Swap Debts - or Write Them Down?, supra note 162, at A21, col. 1
(discussing methods to prevent new lending that the Baker Plan recommends).
219. See Needham, supra note 18, at 31, col. 3 (outlining the adverse consequences
of debt swaps).
220. Id.
221. Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at H3, col. I (explaining why some
Chilean officials do not appreciate debt swapping).
222. Trading Debt for Equity, supra note 184, at 19. Mexican entrepreneurs with
funds outside Mexico have established offshore companies to take advantage of the
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could see this as unfair and protest debt-equity swap use.223 If not con-
trolled, these transactions can also cause inflation. 4 Individuals moni-
toring the banking industry also criticize the transactions because they
do not attract new dollars to debtor countries.2
The major United States banks have developed numerous devices to
manage the Latin American debt crisis. Banks must take advantage of
all of the tactics available to them because legislative and regulatory
attempts alone, like ILSA, will not solve the Latin American debt cri-
sis. 226 Free enterprise and the free market activities associated with the
crisis, such as rescheduling existing loans, syndicating existing loans,
selling and swapping loans, and swapping debt for equity appear to be
the best means to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Even if federal
bank agencies established stricter regulations, United States banks
would petition the regulators for exemptions if the regulations harm
their earnings. Even without petitioning for exemptions, banks will find
ways to avoid the regulations, just as they avoid several of the ILSA
requirements using various accounting measures and investment trans-
actions.
CONCLUSION
After analyzing the Latin American debt crisis, it appears the situa-
tion is not improving. Countries are able to make payments on their
existing debts only if they take out new loans or reschedule or refinance
existing loans. In an attempt to solve some of the problems associated
with the international debt crisis, Congress passed the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983. The Act relied heavily upon federal
regulatory agencies to fulfill its goals and objectives. The federal regu-
lators, however, have been reluctant to promulgate stringent require-
swaps and avoid the limitations. Id. Mexico now conducts case-by-case investigations to
permit local investors to take advantage of debt-equity swaps, similar to those allowed
in Chile. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Venezuela's Plan, supra note 189, at 26, col. I (stating that Mexico lim-
ited its debt-equity swaps because the swaps create inflationary effects); Favorable
Swaps Aid Mexico, supra note 193, at K6, col. I (stating that Mexican finance officials
are concerned that a massive conversion of debt would increase the money supply and
create hyperinflation); Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at H3, col. 4 (noting
that Chile limited its swaps to $60 million per month because of inflationary fears).
225. Chile Shrinks Loan Size, supra note 184, at Hl, col. 2 (referring to debt
swapping as a double-edged sword that reduces a country's foreign debt, but fails to
inject needed foreign capital into its economy).
226. See Review of ILSA, supra note 2, at 13, 18, 24 (reporting that neither the
FRB, OCC, or FDIC recommend changes or amendments to ILSA or any congres-
sional action in the international lending area).
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ments. Even when the regulators have enacted rules, the rules have not
applied because banks use many tactics designed to avoid them. These
tactics allow banks to cope with the Latin American debt crisis and
reduce the risk associated with it. Through this activity, banks are tak-
ing a more realistic view of the crisis. Some banks are realizing that
some countries will never repay their loans. More enlightened banks
are rescheduling, syndicating, selling, swapping, and liquidating their
debts. In attempting to cope with the problem, banks make the best of
a situation that has become uncontrollable.
